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 _____________________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approving the settlement 
of a large class action following its certification of a so-
called settlement class.  Numerous objectors challenge the 
fairness and reasonableness of the settlement.  The objectors 
also challenge:  (1) the district court's failure to certify the 
class formally; (2) its denial of discovery concerning the 
settlement negotiations; (3) the adequacy of the notice as it 
pertained to the fee request; and (4) its approval of the 
attorneys' fee agreement between the defendants and the attorneys 
for the class, which the class notice did not fully disclose, 
thereby (allegedly) depriving the class of the practical 
opportunity to object to the proposed fee award at the fairness 
hearing.   
 The class members are purchasers, over a 15 year 
period, of mid- and full-sized General Motors pick-up trucks with 
model C, K, R, or V chassis, which, it was subsequently 
determined, may have had a design defect in their location of the 
fuel tank.  Objectors claim that the side-saddle tanks rendered 
the trucks especially vulnerable to fuel fires in side 
collisions.  Many of the class members are individual owners 
  
(i.e., own a single truck), while others are "fleet owners," who 
own a number of trucks.  Many of the fleet owners are 
governmental agencies.  As will become apparent, the negotiated 
settlement treats fleet owners quite differently from individual 
owners, a fact with serious implications for the fairness of the 
settlement and the adequacy of representation of the class. 
 While all the issues we have mentioned are significant 
(except for the discovery issue), the threshold and most 
important issue concerns the propriety and prerequisites of 
settlement classes.  The settlement class device is not mentioned 
in the class action rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1  
                     
1
.  Rule 23 provides, in pertinent part: 
 (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.  One or more members of 
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 (b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may be maintained 
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are 
satisfied, and in addition: 
  (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of 
     (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class, or 
     (B) adjudications with respect to individual members 
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of 
the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interests; or 
  (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused 
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
  
Rather it is a judicially crafted procedure.  Usually, the 
request for a settlement class is presented to the court by both 
plaintiff(s) and defendant(s); having provisionally settled the 
case before seeking certification, the parties move for 
simultaneous class certification and settlement approval. Because 
this process is removed from the normal, adversarial, litigation 
mode, the class is certified for settlement purposes only, not 
for litigation.  Sometimes, as here, the parties reach a 
settlement while the case is in litigation posture, only then 
moving the court, with the defendants' stipulation as to the 
(..continued) 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
  (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the 
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
class action. 
 (c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be 
Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as 
Class Actions. 
  (1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by 
order whether it is to be so maintained.  An order under this 
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended 
before the decision on the merits. . . . 
 (e) Dismissal or Compromise.  A class action shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and 
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
  
class's compliance with the Rule 23 requisites, for class 
certification and settlement approval.  In any event, the court 
disseminates notice of the proposed settlement and fairness 
hearing at the same time it notifies class members of the 
pendency of class action determination.  Only when the settlement 
is about to be finally approved does the court formally certify 
the class, thus binding the interests of its members by the 
settlement. 
 The first Manual for Complex Litigation [hereinafter 
MCL] strongly disapproved of settlement classes.  Nevertheless, 
courts have increasingly used the device in recent years, and 
subsequent manuals (MCL 2d and MCL 3d (in draft)) have relented, 
endorsing settlement classes under carefully controlled 
circumstances, but continuing to warn of the potential for abuse.  
This increased use of settlement classes has proven extremely 
valuable for disposing of major and complex national and 
international class actions in a variety of substantive areas 
ranging from toxic torts (Agent Orange) and medical devices 
(Dalkon Shield, breast implant), to antitrust cases (the beef or 
cardboard container industries).  But their use has not been 
problem free, provoking a barrage of criticism that the device is 
a vehicle for collusive settlements that primarily serve the 
interests of defendants -- by granting expansive protection from 
law suits -- and of plaintiffs' counsel -- by generating large 
  
fees gladly paid by defendants as a quid pro quo for finally 
disposing of many troublesome claims.   
 After reflection upon these concerns, we conclude that 
Rule 23 permits courts to achieve the significant benefits 
created by settlement classes so long as these courts abide by 
all of the fundaments of the Rule.  Settlement classes must 
satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation, as well as the 
relevant 23(b) requirements, usually (as in this case) the (b)(3) 
superiority and predominance standards.  We also hold that 
settlement class status (on which settlement approval depends) 
should not be sustained unless the record establishes, by 
findings of the district judge, that the same requisites of the 
Rule are satisfied.  Additionally, we hold that a finding that 
the settlement was fair and reasonable does not serve as a 
surrogate for the class findings, and also that there is no lower 
standard for the certification of settlement classes than there 
is for litigation classes.  But so long as the four requirements 
of 23(a) and the appropriate requirement(s) of 23(b) are met, a 
court may legitimately certify the class under the Rule.   
 In this case the district judge made no Rule 23 
findings, and significant questions remain as to whether the 
class could have met the requisites of the rule had the district 
court applied them.  Principally at issue is adequacy of 
representation.  In particular, the objectors contend that there 
  
is a conflict between the positions of individual owners on the 
one hand and fleet owners on the other hand.  The disparity in 
settlement benefits enjoyed by these different groups, objectors 
argue, creates an intra-class conflict that precludes the finding 
of adequacy of representation required by the rule.  Moreover, 
they submit, the large number of different defenses available 
under the laws of the several states involved also creates a 
potentially serious commonality and typicality problem. 
 We conclude that the objectors' adequacy of 
representation claim probably has merit.  At all events, the 
district court did not properly evaluate the differential impact 
of the settlement on individual fleet owners, and should 
determine on remand whether the conflicts among class members are 
so great as to preclude certification (or at least sufficient to 
require the creation of subclasses).  The district court should 
also focus on the commonality and typicality problems, to 
determine whether the national scope of the class litigation and 
the plethora of defenses available in different jurisdictions 
prevent these requirements from being met. 
 For the reasons that follow at some length, we conclude 
that, although settlement classes are valid generally, this 
settlement class was not properly certified.  We also conclude 
that the settlement is not fair and adequate; more precisely, we 
hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining 
that it was, primarily because the district court erred in 
  
accepting plaintiffs' unreasonably high estimate of the 
settlement's worth, in over-estimating the risk of maintaining 
class status and of establishing liability and damages, and in 
misinterpreting the reaction of the class.  Finally, although our 
disposition of the foregoing issues makes it unnecessary for us 
to pass on the approval of the attorneys fees, we clarify the 
governing standards for these fee awards to guide the district 
court on remand.  We therefore reverse the challenged order of 
the district court and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A.  General Background 
 Between 1973 and 1987, General Motors sold over 6.3 
million C/K pickup trucks with side-mounted fuel tanks.2  In late 
October 1992, after the public announcement of previously 
undisclosed information regarding the safety of the fuel tank 
placement in GM pickups, consumer class action lawsuits were 
filed in several jurisdictions.  The National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") commenced an investigation of the 
alleged defects relating to side-impact fires on these trucks, 
and  consumer advocacy groups sought a recall.3   
 On November 5, 1992, plaintiffs in one action sought to 
enjoin allegedly misleading communications to putative class 
                     
2
.    The class includes both mid-and full-size trucks with 
chassis model types C, K, R, or V. 
3
.  See note 5 infra. 
  
members and filed an application for expedited discovery.  On 
November 8 and 9, 1992, GM filed notices of removal of this and 
other state court actions, and a motion with the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel") to transfer and 
consolidate all actions for pretrial purposes under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407.  The MDL Panel transferred all related actions to the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
February 26, 1993.  Ultimately, dozens of actions were filed in 
various courts throughout the United States on behalf of consumer 
classes; the federal cases were dismissed, remanded to state 
court, or transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
 On March 5, 1993, pursuant to an order of the 
(transferee) District Court, plaintiffs filed a Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint seeking equitable relief and 
damages that consolidated all of the actions under the MDL 
caption and listed nearly 300 representative plaintiffs, 
including both individual and fleet owners.  The Complaint 
alleged violations of two federal statutes; the Magnuson-Moss Act 
and the Lanham Trademark Act; a variety of common law and 
statutory claims, including negligence, fraud, breach of written 
and implied warranty; and violations of various state consumer 
statutes.  The complaint sought, inter alia, an order remedying 
the alleged abnormally high incidence of fuel-fed fires following 
side-impact collisions by requiring GM to recall the trucks or 
pay for their repair. (JA 37, 93.) GM answered this complaint, 
  
denying all substantive allegations and raising numerous 
affirmative defenses. 
 Also on March 5, 1993, plaintiffs filed a consolidated 
motion for nationwide class certification.  The court set July 
19, 1993, the hearing date on this motion.  On March 30, 1993, GM 
moved to stay this litigation pending the outcome of the NHTSA 
investigation, initiated in December 1992.  This motion was 
denied on June 4, 1993.  Pursuant to a scheduling order issued by 
the court, discovery during the spring of 1993 focused on class 
certification issues.  (JA1824-27.)  During this discovery, GM 
produced more than 100,000 pages of documents from prior C/K 
pickup product liability lawsuits and GM's responses to NHTSA 
information requests.  Plaintiffs also had access to the 
depositions and trial testimony in other cases involving the fuel 
tank design of C/K pickups, including the jury trial in Moseley 
v. GM, No. 90-V-6276 (Fulton County, Ga.).  Plaintiffs consulted 
with their own experts to evaluate this information.  In 
addition, depositions were taken of some GM personnel and certain 
named plaintiffs.  Discovery on the merits of the case had been 
postponed until autumn 1993.  Nothing in the record indicates 
that, as of the spring of 1993, counsel had identified expert 
witnesses for trial or deposed GM's engineering experts. 
 In the midst of these proceedings, the parties began 
exploring a possible settlement of the litigation.  These 
discussions intensified in June 1993, at which time face-to-face 
  
and telephonic meetings, both between the parties and among 
plaintiffs' counsel, took place on virtually a daily basis.  On 
July 19, 1993, the parties reached a settlement in principle, 
reduced the terms to writing, and informed the district court.4  
For purposes of settlement only and without prejudice to GM's 
substantial opposition to class certification, the named parties 
agreed to the certification of a settlement class of C/K pickup 
owners, described below. 
 B.  The Settlement Agreement 
 In general terms, the settlement agreement provides for 
members of the settlement class to receive $1,000 coupons 
redeemable toward the purchase of any new GMC Truck or Chevrolet 
light duty truck.  Settlement certificates are transferable with 
the vehicle.  They are redeemable by the then current owner of 
the 1973-86 C/K and 1987-91 R/V light duty pickup trucks or 
chassis cabs at any authorized Chevrolet or GMC Truck dealer for 
a fifteen month period.  Settlement class members do not have to 
trade in their current vehicle to use the certificate, and the 
                     
4
.   GM reached a substantially identical agreement with counsel 
representing a class of C/K pickup truck purchasers who are Texas 
residents in Dollar v. General Motors, No. 92-1089 (71st Judicial 
District, Marshall, Tex.)(JA1708, 1746).  That settlement was 
approved in November 1993, but was overturned on appeal on June 
22, 1994.  See Bloyed v. General Motors Corporation, Dollar et 
al., 881 S.W. 422 (6th App. Dist., Tex. June 22, 1994), discussed 
infra at VI(I).  The Texas Supreme Court granted GM's Application 
for Writ of Error on February 16, 1995 and set the case for oral 
argument on March 21, 1995.   
  
certificates can be used in conjunction with GM and GMAC 
incentive programs.   
 The class members can freely transfer the certificate 
to an immediate family member who resides with the class member.  
Class members can also transfer the $1000 certificate to a family 
member who does not reside with the class member by designating 
the transferee family member within sixty days, running from the 
date that GM mailed notice of the proposed settlement.  
Additionally, the $1000 certificate can be transferred with the 
title to the settlement class vehicle, that is, to a third party 
who purchases the class member's vehicle. 
 In lieu of a $1,000 certificate, and without 
transferring title to the settlement class vehicle, a class 
member may instead request that a nontransferable $500 
certificate (counterintuitively known as the "transfer 
certificate") be issued to any third party except a GMC dealer or 
its affiliates.  This $500 certificate is redeemable with the 
purchase of a new C or K series GMC or Chevrolet full-size pickup 
truck or its replacement model.  The $500 certificate cannot be 
used in conjunction with any GMC or GMAC marketing incentive, 
must be used on the more expensive full size models, and is 
subject to the same fifteen-month redemption period as the $1,000 
certificates.  The class member must make a notarized request to 
GM, and GM will mail the $500 certificate to the transferee 
within 14 days of its receipt of the request for transfer.   
  
 Under the terms of the agreement, the approval of the 
settlement and corresponding entry of final judgment would have 
no effect upon any accrued or future claims for personal injury 
or death, nor would it affect the rights of settlement class 
members to participate in any future remedial action that might 
be required under the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 
1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1995).5  (JA 1750, 1763-64.) 
 The settlement agreement before us also provides that 
plaintiffs' counsel would apply to the district court for an 
award of reasonable attorneys' fees and reimbursement of 
expenses, both to be paid by GM.  GM reserved the right to object 
to any fees or expenses it deemed to be excessive and to appeal 
any amount awarded by the court over its objection. (JA 1750, 
1755-56.)  Plaintiffs' counsel filed their fee applications on or 
about September 15, 1993; the fee applications remained in the 
files of the clerk of the district court where class members 
could theoretically review them, but no information about 
attorneys' fees other than the fact that a fee application would 
be made was included in the class notice.  GM did not file any 
formal objections to the fee applications. 
                     
5
.   After oral argument in this case, United States 
Transportation Secretary Federico Pena announced that NHTSA had  
settled the proceeding involving the C/K trucks at issue here 
without ordering a recall, finding an acceptable retrofit, or 
giving any compensation to the truck owners.  The settlement 
provided that GM would contribute $51 million to general safety 
programs unrelated to the trucks' alleged problems.  See 
Statement by Secretary Federico Pena on Dec. 2, 1994, Settlement 
Regarding DOT Investigation of General Motors C/K Pickup Trucks. 
  
 C.  Approval of the Settlement and Fees 
 The district court reviewed the substantive terms of 
the settlement on July 12, 1993 and made the preliminary 
determination, in Pretrial Order No. 7, entered July 20, 1993, 
that the proposed settlement appeared reasonable. (JA 1828-33.)  
Also in pretrial order no. 7, the court "provisionally" certified 
the class of GM truck owners as a settlement class (i.e., for 
settlement purposes only) pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3); however, the 
court did not make findings that the requisites of Rule 23(a) or 
23(b) were satisfied.  (JA 1828-33.)  The court approved the form 
of and dissemination to putative class members of the combined 
notice of the pendency of the action and the proposed settlement 
pursuant to Rules 23(c)(2) and 23(e).  The class definition 
included all persons and entities who purchased in the United 
States (except for residents of the State of Texas) and were 
owners as of July 19, 1993 of (1) a 1973-1986 model year General 
Motors full-size pickup truck or chassis cab of the "C" or "K" 
series; or (2) a 1987-1991 model year General Motors full-size 
pickup truck or chassis cab of the "R" or "V" series.  (JA 1828.)  
On August 20 and 21, 1993, GM mailed the notice to all registered 
owners of class vehicles (including nearly 5.7 million vehicles), 
and it published the full text of the notice in USA Today and The 
Philadelphia Inquirer on August 27, 1993.  
 In response to the notice, over 5,200 truck owners 
elected to opt out of the class, and approximately 6,500 truck 
  
owners (a number which includes fleet owners who own as many as 
1,000 vehicles each) objected to the settlement.  The objectors' 
filings contained many overlapping claims.  The recurring 
contentions were that:  (1) the settlement does nothing to fix 
the trucks (JA 1854,55,57); (2) even with the $1,000 coupon, many 
owners would be unable to purchase a new truck given their high 
cost (with list prices from $11,000 to $33,000); (3) state and 
local government fleet owners would not be able to redeem all of 
their certificates (by buying new vehicles) within the short 
redemption period (fifteen months), and they might be further 
restricted from using the coupons by competitive bidding 
procurement rules; and (4) GM and class counsel colluded in a 
manner that compromised the interests of the class and that would 
preclude a finding of adequate representation.  GM rejoined with 
voluminous material emphasizing the substantial risks plaintiffs 
faced not only in maintaining class treatment but also in 
establishing liability and damages.  
 A settlement fairness hearing was held on October 26, 
1993 during which the objectors who submitted written briefs were 
permitted to speak.  The district court approved the settlement 
in a Memorandum and Order dated December 16, 1993.  In that 
order, the court confirmed its Pretrial Order No. 7, which had 
provisionally certified the settlement class.  Although the court 
still made no findings that the requisites of Rules 23(a) and (b) 
were met, it did set forth findings of fact and conclusions of 
  
law to justify its approval of the settlement as fair, reasonable 
and adequate based on the nine-factor test established in Girsh 
v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975).  
 The court found that the total economic value of the 
settlement was "between $1.98 billion and $2.18 billion." (App. 
1727)  Against the prospect of settlement, the court weighed each 
of the nine Girsh factors.  It concluded that "the complexity, 
expense and likely duration of the litigation would be mammoth." 
(op. 6)(JA 1708, 1713)  Although the settlement was reached at an 
early stage of the litigation, just four months after the 
consolidated complaint was filed, the court found that this did 
not weigh against the settlement because the court believed that 
the parties had access to "extensive discovery on the same issues 
of product defect that was previously conducted in the various 
personal injury actions that have been litigated throughout the 
country." (op. 8-9)(JA1715-16)  The district court also found 
that the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement 
supported approval citing "the infinitesimal number of truck 
owners who have either objected to or sought exclusion from the 
settlement." (JA1715.)   
 Noting the divided results of the personal-injury jury 
trials and the numerous defenses GM could raise, the court found 
that "a substantial risk in establishing liability" weighed in 
favor of approval.  Similarly, the court found that "[p]erhaps 
the greatest weakness in the plaintiffs' case is the lack of 
  
proof of economic damages."  (JA1721.)  The court also addressed 
the objection that the settlement did not provide for a recall or 
a "fix," explaining that "no objector that complains that the 
settlement fails to retrofit the alleged defect has been able to 
come forth with a practical and safe modification for the trucks 
that has been designed, evaluated and tested." (JA1736.)   
 On December 20, 1993, four days after approving the 
settlement, the district court also approved the class counsel's 
request for attorneys' fees in the amount of $9.5 million.  
Although the court did not believe at that time that it needed to 
review that fee award, to which GM had agreed, it subsequently, 
on February 2, 1994, issued an "amplified order" evaluating the 
award in greater detail.  The court determined that the fee 
request was reasonable under both a lodestar analysis and the 
percentage-of-recovery method (see Part VII infra).   (JA 1775.) 
 D.  The NHTSA Investigation 
 While this case was under submission to this court, the 
NHTSA investigation continued.  Over the objections of some of 
NHTSA's engineers who had determined that the trucks complied 
with relevant safety standards, on October 17, 1994, Secretary of 
Transportation Federico Pena announced the agency's finding that 
the trucks contained a safety defect creating an increased and 
unreasonable risk of side-impact fires.  The determination was 
based on the allegedly enhanced risk of side-impact fires 
relative to Ford pickups that resulted from GM's placement of the 
  
fuel tanks outside the frame rails.  GM challenged the propriety 
of the public meeting NHTSA planned to hold and NHTSA's authority 
to order a recall of vehicles that met all relevant safety 
standards.  On December 2, 1994, Secretary Pena announced the 
settlement of the C/K pickup investigation wherein GM contributed 
over $51 million for a variety of safety programs unrelated to 
the pickups, and admitted no liability.6 
 E.  Standard of Review 
 Each of the issues presented here is reviewable for 
abuse of discretion.  See Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) 
(approval of proposed class action settlement); In re School 
Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1338, 1341 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991) (class certification);  Lindy Bros. 
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976) (award of reasonable attorney's 
fees); Marrogquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984) (scope of discovery).  
An appellate court may find an abuse of discretion where the 
"district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application 
of law to fact."  International Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 
820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 
(1991).  A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although 
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.  See note 5 supra. 
  
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, based on 
the entire evidence, concludes with firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.  Oberti v. Board. of Ed. of Borough of 
Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). 
II.  ANATOMY OF THE CLASS CLAIMS 
 The consolidated class complaint filed on behalf of the 
nationwide class of GM truck owners (except those from Texas) 
alleged violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2310(d)(1) (1995); and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) 
(1995); and a variety of state common law and statutory claims, 
including strict liability in tort for selling a dangerously 
defective product; negligent design; negligent misrepresentation; 
fraud (based on defendants' alleged course of conduct in the 
advertising, promotion, and sale of the GM pickups intentionally 
concealing material facts about a dangerous latent defect); 
breach of warranty, including written (from vehicle warranties), 
express (from public representations by GM), implied (warranties 
of merchantability) and statutory warranties; and finally 
violations of various state consumer protection statutes. (JA37).  
The case did not involve any pickup trucks that had actually 
experienced fuel tank fires caused by side-impact collisions.  
Moreover, personal injury or death claims were expressly omitted 
from the complaint as well as from the settlement -- class 
members remain free to pursue such claims if any should accrue. 
  
 The aggregated treatment of these claims was 
potentially complicated by the differences in underlying facts.  
The trucks at issue had nineteen different fuel tank systems; 
proof might thus be required for each design on relevant issues.  
Furthermore, unlike the federal securities laws where there is a 
presumption of reliance on a material misrepresentation, see 
Basic v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), plaintiffs would likely 
have had to prove individual reliance on the allegedly misleading 
materials under the various state laws applicable to most of 
these claims.  More fundamentally, the complaint itself invoked 
state laws that implicated different legal standards on, for 
example, the warranty claims (the laws contain various privity 
requirements or the need for an allegedly defective product to 
fail in service before a warranty claim can be sustained), 
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and strict products 
liability.  The state laws implicated by the filing of the 
nationwide class action also differed on such issues as statutes 
of limitations, whether pickup trucks are "consumer products;" 
the application of durational limits on implied warranties; the 
requirement of reliance to  recover for fraud, misrepresentation, 
and warranty claims; whether intent is a required element of 
negligent misrepresentation claims; whether comparative fault is 
a defense; and the relevant test for plaintiffs' design defect 
claims. 
III.  RULE 23 - RELEVANT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
  
 Before turning to the precise questions at issue on 
this appeal, it is important that we consider the several basic 
purposes served by class actions in our contemporary, complex 
litigation-laden legal system.  One of the paramount values in 
this system is efficiency.  Class certification enables courts to 
treat common claims together, obviating the need for repeated 
adjudications of the same issues.  See Vol. 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA 
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.06 (Third Ed. 1992); General Tel. 
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 149 (1982).    
 The Supreme Court has articulated other important 
objectives served by class actions.  Class actions achieve "the 
protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the 
protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a 
convenient and economical means for disposing of similar 
lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation 
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims."  United 
States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 pinpoint (1980).  
The Court has  explained the significance of the last goal as  
 an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
unremedied by the regulatory action of government.  
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief 
within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of 
small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons 
may be without any effective redress unless they may 
employ the class-action device.  
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 
(1980); see also Vol 1 NEWBERG & CONTE § 1.06 at 1-19.  Cost 
spreading can also enhance the means for private attorney general 
  
enforcement and the resulting deterrence of wrongdoing.  Id. § 
1.06 at 1-18 to 1-20.   
 The law favors settlement, particularly in class 
actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial 
resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation.  See 
NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.41 at 11-85 (citing cases); Cotton v. Hinton, 
559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); Van Brankhorst v. Safeco 
Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976).  The parties may also 
gain significantly from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy 
and complex trial.  See First Com. Corp. of Boston Customer Accts 
Litig., 119 F.R.D. 301, 306-07 (D. Mass. 1987).  These economic 
gains multiply when settlement also avoids the costs of 
litigating class status -- often a complex litigation within 
itself.  Furthermore, a settlement may represent the best method 
of distributing damage awards to injured plaintiffs, especially 
where litigation would delay and consume the available resources 
and where piecemeal settlement could result, in the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund context, in a sub-optimal distribution 
of the damage awards.  See, e.g., In re Dennis Greenman 
Securities Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1987).    
 Thus, courts should favor the use of devices that tend 
to foster negotiated solutions to these actions.  Prima facie, 
this would include settlement classes.  True, it was once thought 
that mass tort actions were ordinarily not appropriate for class 
treatment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee's note, 
  
subdivision (b)(3), 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).  It has also been 
argued that mass tort cases strain the boundaries of Rule 23.  
See Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: 
Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of 
Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 461 
(1988) (suggesting necessity of rule revisions to accommodate 
class action treatment of mass torts).  However, the 
applicability of Rule 23 to mass tort cases has become 
commonplace, and the use of the class action device, specifically 
the (b)(3) class, has created some of the largest and most 
innovative settlements in these contexts.  Prominent examples 
include the recent $4.2 billion settlement of the breast implant 
litigation.  See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. 
Liability Litig., 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. 1994). 
 Despite the potential benefits of class actions, there 
remains an overarching concern -- that absentees' interests are 
being resolved and quite possibly bound by the operation of res 
judicata even though most of the plaintiffs are not the real 
parties to the suit.  The protection of the absentees' due 
process rights depends in part on the extent the named plaintiffs 
are adequately interested to monitor the attorneys (who are, of 
course, presumed motivated to achieve maximum results by the 
prospect of substantial fees), and also on the extent that the 
class representatives have interests that are sufficiently 
aligned with the absentees to assure that the monitoring serves 
  
the interests of the class as a whole.  In addition, the court 
plays the important role of protector of the absentees' 
interests, in a sort of fiduciary capacity, by approving 
appropriate representative plaintiffs and class counsel.  
 Another problem is that class actions create the 
opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail:  a greedy and 
unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large class 
action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a 
settlement far in excess of the individual claims' actual worth.  
Because absentees are not parties to the action in any real 
sense, and probably would not have brought their claims 
individually, see Mars Steel v. Continental Illinois National 
Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1987), attorneys or 
plaintiffs can abuse the suit nominally brought in the absentees' 
names.  As one court has  noted, "[t]his fundamental departure 
from the traditional pattern in Anglo-American litigation 
generates a host of problems . . . ."  Id. 
 The drafters designed the procedural requirements of 
Rule 23, especially the requisites of subsection (a), so that the 
court can assure, to the greatest extent possible, that the 
actions are prosecuted on behalf of the actual class members in a 
way that makes it fair to bind their interests.  The rule thus 
represents a measured response to the issues of how the due 
process rights of absentee interests can be protected and how 
absentees' represented status can be reconciled with a litigation 
  
system premised on traditional bipolar litigation.  Moreover, the 
requirement in Rule 23(c) that the court decide certification 
motions "as soon as practicable," see note 1 supra, aims to 
reduce even further the possibility that a party could use the 
ill-founded threat of a class action to control negotiations or 
the possibility that absentees' interests could be unfairly 
bound.  Hence, the procedural formalities of certification are 
important even if the case appears to be headed for settlement 
rather than litigation. 
 This expanded role of the court in class actions 
(relative to conventional bipolar litigation) continues even 
after certification.  While the parties in a normal suit do not 
ordinarily require a judge's approval to settle the action, class 
action parties do.  Rule 23(e) provides:  "A class action  shall 
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall 
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court 
directs." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(E).  Courts and commentators have 
interpreted this rule to require courts to "independently and  
objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances before it in 
order to determine whether the settlement is in the best interest 
of those whose claims will be extinguished."  2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 
11.41 at 11-88 to 11-89.  "Under Rule 23(e) the district court 
acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of 
absent class members. . . .  [T]he court cannot accept a 
  
settlement that the proponents have not shown to be fair, 
reasonable and adequate." Grunin v. International House of 
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 
(1975); Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983); Sala 
v. National RR Passenger Corp., 721 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1989); 
see also Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.), cert 
denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). 
 Before sending notice of the settlement to the class, 
the court will usually approve the settlement preliminarily.  
This preliminary determination establishes an initial presumption 
of fairness when the court finds that:  (1) the negotiations 
occurred at arm's length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; (3) 
the proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar 
litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class objected.  
See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.41 at 11-91. 
 As noted above, this court has adopted a nine-factor 
test to help district courts structure their final decisions to 
approve settlements as fair, reasonable, and adequate as required 
by Rule 23(e). See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 
1975).  Those factors are:  (1) the  complexity and duration of 
the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; 
(3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the risks of establishing 
liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks 
of maintaining a class action; (7) the ability of the defendants 
to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness 
  
of the settlement in light of the best recovery; and (9) the 
range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the 
attendant risks of litigation.  Id.  The proponents of the 
settlement bear the burden of proving that these factors weigh in 
favor of approval.  See GM Interchange, 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 n.30 
7th Cir. 1979); Holden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 
1398, 1407 (D. Minn. 1987); MCL 2d §30.44.  The findings required 
by the Girsh test are factual, see Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d at 
434; Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 564, 659 (2d Cir. 1982), 
which will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, 
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 207 (5th Cir. 1981). 
IV.  SETTLEMENT CLASSES 
 This appeal challenges (among other things) the 
district court's class certification order.  Before we may 
address the propriety of the court's order we must first decide 
whether it is ever proper to certify a class for settlement 
purposes only.  We therefore begin our analysis with a closer 
look at how settlement classes operate. 
 A.  Nature of the Device 
 As we have explained above, a settlement class is a 
device whereby the court postpones the formal certification 
procedure until the parties have successfully negotiated a 
settlement, thus allowing a defendant to explore settlement 
  
without conceding any of its arguments against certification.  
Despite the directive of Rule 23(c) that courts certify actions 
as soon as practicable, when a class action has been filed before 
the settlement has been arrived at courts will often delay the 
certification determination during the pendency of settlement 
discussions.  If the settlement negotiations succeed, courts will 
certify the class for settlement purposes only and send a 
combined notice of class pendency and settlements to the class 
members.  Thus, by the time the court considers certification, 
the defendant has essentially stipulated to the existence of the 
class requirements since it now has an interest in binding an 
entire class with its proffered settlement.    
 By specifying certification for settlement purposes 
only, however, the court preserves the defendant's ability to 
contest certification should the settlement fall apart.  Because 
the court indulges the assumption of the class's existence only 
until a settlement is reached or the parties abandon the 
negotiations, settlement classes are also sometimes referred to 
as temporary or provisional classes.  Sometimes the specification 
may also be seen as assuming that the class may only meet the 
requirements of Rule 23 if the action is settled, and that 
certification may in fact be inappropriate if the action will 
actually be litigated.  In any event, notwithstanding that there 
is an absence of clear textual authorization for settlement 
classes, many courts have indulged the stipulations of parties by 
  
establishing temporary classes for settlement purposes only.  
See, e.g., Mars Steel v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bk. & Trust, 
834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); In re A.H. 
Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738-39 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Dennis 
Greeman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1978); 
Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Beef 
Industry Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 173 (5th  Cir. 1979);  
Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 427, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1983); In re 
Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 1994 WL 643142 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 
1994); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 1994 
WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); In re First Commodity Corp. 
of Boston, 119 F.R.D. 301, 306-08 (D. Mass. 1987); In re 
Bendectin, 102 F.R.D. 239, 240 (S.D. Oh. 1984), rev'd on other 
grounds, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota 
Anti-trust Litig., 564 F.Supp. 1379, 1388-90 (D. Md. 1983); In re 
Chicken Antitrust Litig., 560 F.Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
 There has been a great deal of commentary, both 
critical7 and laudatory,8 of the use of these "settlement 
classes."  And some courts have criticized these accommodations 
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.   See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class 
Action, WALL ST. J. Sept. 7, 1994, at A15.  
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.  2 Newberg & Conte § 11.27 (First) § 1.46; Roger H. Transgrud, 
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 
779 (1985); Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee 
Right?:  Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent 
Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
461, 480 
  
of the negotiating parties and expressed their ambivalence while 
continuing nonetheless to use them.  See, e.g., Mars Steel, 834 
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing considerable dangers of 
settlement classes but ultimately upholding the settlement).  
Before we interpret the dictates of Rule 23 with respect to 
settlement classes, it will be useful to survey both the 
criticism and the praise. 
 B.  Perceived Problems of Settlement Classes 
 A number of commentators, particularly the authors of 
the first edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation, have 
voiced serious concerns about settlement classes.  These 
criticisms have focused on the fact that Rule 23, a carefully 
constructed scheme intended to protect the rights of absentees 
that necessarily relies on active judicial participation to 
protect those interests, does not authorize a separate category 
of class certification that would permit a dilution of or 
dispense with the subsection (a) criteria.  § 1.46; see also Mars 
Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 680 
(7th Cir. 1987);  In re Baldwin United, 105 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984).  Other criticisms focus on the potential prejudice to the 
parties and the institutional threat posed to the court.  See, 
e.g., Coffee, supra note 10. 
 Rule 23 does not in terms authorize the deferral of 
class  certification pending settlement discussions.  Indeed, 
Rule 23(c) provides:  "As soon as practicable after the 
  
commencement of  an action brought as a class action, the court 
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis supplied).  Deliberately delaying 
a class certification determination so that settlement 
discussions can proceed clearly does not represent an effort to 
resolve the issue "as soon as practicable."  As Judge Posner has 
noted, "[i]t is hard to see why the propriety of maintaining the 
suit as a class action could not 'practicably' have been 
determined much earlier.  And, common though the practice of 
deferring class certification while settlement negotiations are 
going on is, it not only jostles uneasily with the language of 
Rule 23(c)(1) but also creates practical problems."  Mars Steel, 
834 F.2d at 680. 
 The danger here is that the court cannot properly 
discharge its duty to protect the interests of the absentees 
during the disposition of the action.  Because the class has not 
yet been defined, the court lacks the information necessary to 
determine the identity of the absentees and the likely extent of 
liability, damages, and expenses of preparing for trial.  See MCL 
2d § 30.45 at 243 ("No one may know how many members are in the 
class, how large their potential claims are, what the strengths 
and weaknesses of the parties' positions are, or how much the 
class will benefit under the settlement."); In re Baldwin United, 
105 F.R.D. 475, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).  Moreover, the court 
performs its role as supervisor/protector without the benefit of 
  
a full adversarial briefing on the certification issues.  With 
less information about the class, the judge cannot as effectively 
monitor for collusion, individual settlements, buy-offs (where 
some individuals use the class action device to benefit 
themselves at the expense of absentees), and other abuses.  See 
In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 174.  For 
example, if the court fails to define the class before settlement 
negotiations commence, then during the settlement approval phase 
the judge will have greater difficulty detecting if the parties 
improperly manipulated the scope of the class in order to buy the 
defendant's acquiescence.   
 Settlement classes also make it more difficult for a 
court to evaluate the settlement by depriving the judge of the 
customary structural devices of Rule 23 and the presumptions of 
propriety that they generate.  Ordinarily, a court relies on 
class status, particularly the adequacy of representation 
required to maintain it, to infer that the settlement was the 
product of arm's length negotiations.  Cf. Weinberger v. 
Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting protracted 
nature of negotiations in approving settlement); City of Detroit 
v. Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); In re 
Baldwin-United, 105 F.R.D. 475, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).  
Where the court has not yet certified a class or named its 
representative or counsel, this assumption is questionable.   
  
 In effect, settlement classes can, depending how they 
are used, evade the processes intended to protect the rights of 
absentees.  Indeed, the draft of the MCL (Third), although 
considerably more receptive to settlement classes than the 
earlier editions of the Manual, explains that "[t]he problem 
presented by these requests is not the lack of sufficient 
information and scrutiny, but rather the possibility that 
fiduciary responsibilities of class counsel or class 
representatives may have been compromised."  MCL (Third) (draft) 
at 193.  Even some courts successfully using these devices to 
achieve settlements apparently recognize these dangers since they 
certify these actions more cautiously than ordinary classes.  
See, e.g., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 
33 (3d Cir. 1971) (court must be doubly careful where negotiation 
occurs before certification and designation of a class counsel); 
In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(examining though ultimately rejecting the charge that collusion 
precluded the certification of the settlement class); Simer v. 
Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 664-66 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring a higher 
showing of fairness where settlement negotiated prior to 
certification); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 
1982) (judge made findings about discovery and counsel). 
 In particular, settlement classes create especially 
lucrative opportunities for putative class attorneys to generate 
fees for themselves without any effective monitoring by class 
  
members who have not yet been apprised of the pendency of the 
action.  Moreover, because the court does not appoint a class 
counsel until the case is certified, attorneys jockeying for 
position might attempt to cut a deal with the defendants by 
underselling the plaintiffs' claims relative to other attorneys.9  
Unauthorized settlement negotiations occurring before the 
certification determination thus "create the possibility of 
negotiation from a position of weakness by the attorney who 
purports to represent the class."  GM Interchange Litigation, 594 
F.2d 1106, 1125 (7th Cir. 1979).  Pre-certification negotiations 
also hamper a court's ability to review the true value of the 
settlement or the legal services after the fact.  See supra at 
36. In addition, unauthorized negotiations also result in denying 
other plaintiffs' counsel information that is necessary for them 
to make an effective evaluation of the fairness of any settlement 
that results.  See GM Interchange, 594 F.2d at 1125.   
 Framed as an issue of Rule 23(a) requisites, these 
considerations implicate adequacy of representation concerns:  
"[a]rguments in opposition to settlement classes have merit when 
they are addressed to the problem of inadequate representation or 
possible collusion among the named plaintiffs and some or all 
defendants."  In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 480 
                     
9
.  These sorts of dynamics have led some critics to accuse class 
action attorneys of ethical violations.  While we emphasize that 
counsel here committed no such violations, we do not preclude the 
possibility that these violations could occur. 
  
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).  Another court has warned that the "danger of a 
premature, even a collusive, settlement [is] increased when as in 
this case the status of the action as a class action is not 
determined until a settlement has been negotiated, with all the 
momentum that a settlement agreement generates . . . ."; Mars 
Steel, 834 F.2d at 680; see also Malchman, 706 F.2d at 433 
(recognizing special potential for collusion or undue pressure by 
defendants in settlement negotiations); Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 
73 (requiring a higher showing of fairness to accommodate greater 
potential for improper settlement).  Settlement classes, which 
constitute ad hoc adjustments to the carefully designed class 
action framework constructed by Rule 23, lack the regulatory 
mechanisms that ordinarily check this improper behavior:  "There 
is in fact little or no individual client consultation and no 
judicial oversight of a hidden process of wheeling and dealing to 
maximize overall recovery and fees for hundreds and thousands of 
massed cases."  In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos 
Litigation, 129 B.R. 710, 802 (E & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the 
ramifications of class treatment of mass torts). 
 In addition to these procedural problems (and the 
problems created for a judge trying to evaluate both class status 
and the adequacy of a class settlement simultaneously) the 
earlier achievement of settlement through the use of a settlement 
class also can lead to a settlement that may provide inadequate 
consideration in exchange for the release of the class's claims.  
  
With early settlement, both parties have less information on the 
merits.  That is, they have less information on the membership of 
the class, on the size of potential claims, on whether the 
settlement purports to resolve class or individual claims, on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the case, and on how class members 
will benefit from the settlement. See MCL 2d § 30.45 at 243-44; 2 
NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.09 at 11-13. Without the benefit of more 
extensive discovery, both sides may underestimate the strength of 
the plaintiffs' claims.   
 Turning to the question of due process rights, we note 
that class members may, as a result of these information 
deficiencies, not be in a fair position at this early stage to 
evaluate whether or not the settlement represents a superior 
alternative to litigating.  Perhaps more troubling in light of 
the reality that absentees tend to lack a real understanding of 
the actions supposedly pursued in their names is that, "where 
notice of the class action is . . . sent simultaneously with the 
notice of the settlement itself, [the settlement class paradigm], 
the class members are presented with what looks like a fait 
accompli."  Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680-81.  Thus, even if they 
have enough information to conclude the settlement is 
insufficient and unsatisfactory, see In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 
607 F.2d 167, 173 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 
(1981), the mere presentation of the settlement notice with the 
class notice may pressure even skeptical class members to accept 
  
the settlement out of the belief that, unless they are willing to 
litigate their claims individually -- often economically 
infeasible -- they really have no choice. 
  In a different vein, a number of cases have also 
criticized settlement classes on the grounds that they create an 
opportunity for "one-way intervention," allowing putative class 
members to wait to see whether they think the settlement is 
favorable before deciding whether they want to be bound by it.  
See McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 420 (7th 
Cir. 1977); Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 475 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1986) ("A deferred ruling [on certification] converts the 
class action to an opportunity for one-way intervention, which 
Rule 23 is designed to avoid. . . ."); Premier Electrical Constr. 
Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 
363 (7th Cir. 1987) (criticizing delay of certification).  
Because class members have the opportunity to wait until the 
outcome is known (i.e., the settlement's terms are determined) to 
decide whether they want to be bound by the result, courts and 
defendants are exposed to the same potential for multiple 
lawsuits that class actions are designed to avoid, and the 
supposed advantages of settlement classes are largely eroded. 
 Perhaps more troubling, the possibility of pre-
certification negotiation and settlement may facilitate the 
filing of strike suits.  Since settlement classes can involve a 
settlement achieved either before or after the filing of class 
  
claims, recognition of the settlement class device allows 
plaintiffs to file as class actions cases that counsel never 
intended to have certified, but instead only to settle the claims 
individually.  Mars Steel, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1984) 
("[Plaintiffs will be tempted to add class claims in order to 
intimidate the defendant, then delete them by way of 
compromise.").  Knowing that they would not face judicial 
scrutiny if they settle before certification, plaintiffs' lawyers 
face no deterrent from attempting to extract larger settlements 
by threatening class litigation than they could with the cases 
filed individually. 
 In many respects then, the failings of settlement 
classes are a function of the dearth of information available to 
judges attempting to scrutinize the settlements in accordance 
with their Rule 23(e) duties.  Because the issue of certification 
is never actively contested, the judge never receives the benefit 
of the adversarial process that provides the information needed 
to review propriety of the class and the adequacy of settlement.  
This problem is exacerbated where the parties agree on a 
settlement of the case before the class action is filed, since a 
motion for certification and settlement are presented 
simultaneously.  
 Last, but by no means least, the use of settlement 
classes also risks transforming the courts into mediation forums.  
See Coffee, supra note 9 at A15.  Cases could be filed without 
  
any expectation or intention of litigation, with the 
foreknowledge that the natural hydraulic pressure for settlement 
may in fact lead to a class settlement, especially given the 
incentive a defendant has to bind as many potential claimants as 
possible with an approved class settlement.  Courts may approve 
these class settlements even if the case is highly inappropriate 
for class treatment, since judges confronting the reality of 
already over-taxed judicial resources, see Proposed Long Range 
Plan for the Federal Courts (March 1995) at 9-12, may feel 
constrained to dispose of such onerous litigation through the 
settlement class device.  The losers in this type of scenario are 
not only inadequately represented class members but also the 
federal courts as an institution, because their resources are 
further sapped by entertaining cases that arguably do not belong 
there.10  This increased burden will be especially problematic if 
the standards for certification are relaxed for settlement 
classes; as this appeal demonstrates, proceedings attendant to 
settlement class certification can consume considerable federal 
judicial time.    
 C.  Arguments Favoring Settlement Classes 
 Although settlement classes are vulnerable to potent 
criticisms, some important dynamics militate in favor of a 
                     
10
.  Because the parties do not come before the court until the 
action has settled, some courts have even expressed concern that 
such cases do not present a case or controversy for Article III 
purposes.  Cf. Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 
1437, 1462-67 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
  
judge's  delaying or even substantially avoiding class 
certification determinations.  Because certification so 
dramatically increases the potential value of the suit to the 
plaintiffs and their attorneys as well as the potential liability 
of the defendant, the parties will frequently contest 
certification vigorously.  As a result, a defendant considering a 
settlement may resist agreeing to class certification because, if 
the settlement negotiations should fail, it would be left exposed 
to major litigation.  See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 
F.2d 167, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A blanket rule against 
settlement classes] may render it virtually impossible for the 
parties to compromise class issues and reach a proposed class 
settlement before a class certification . . . ."); In re Baldwin 
United, 105 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).    
 In mass tort cases, in particular, use of a settlement 
class can help overcome certain elements of these actions that 
otherwise can considerably complicate efforts to settle.  These 
hurdles include "the large number of individual plaintiffs and 
lawyers; . . . the existence of unfiled claims by putative 
plaintiffs; and . . . the inability of any single plaintiff to 
offer the settling defendant reliable indemnity protection 
. . . ." Transgrud, 70 CORNELL L. REV. at 835.  By using the courts 
to overcome some of the collective action problems particularly 
acute in mass tort cases, the settlement class device can make 
settlement feasible.  The use of settlement classes can thus 
  
enable both parties to realize substantial savings in litigation 
expenses by compromising the action before formal certification.  
See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.09 at 11-13.  Through settlement class 
certification, courts have fostered settlement of some very 
large, complex cases that might otherwise never have yielded 
deserving plaintiffs any substantial renumeration.    
 Settlement classes also increase the number of actions 
that are amenable to settlement by increasing the rewards of a 
negotiated solution, in at least four ways.  First, the prospect 
of class certification increases a defendant's incentive to 
settle because the settlement would then bind the class members 
and prevent further suits against the defendant.  Second, 
settlement classes may reduce litigation costs by allowing 
defendants to stipulate to class certification without forfeiting 
any of their legal arguments against certification should the 
negotiations fail.  Third,  because the payment of settlement 
proceeds, even relatively small amounts, may palliate class 
members, settlement can reduce differences among class members, 
and thus make class certification more likely, increasing the 
value of settlement to the defendant, since a larger number of 
potential claims can thus be resolved.   Fourth, the use of 
settlement classes reduces the probability of a successful 
subsequent challenge to the class-wide settlement.   By treating 
the class as valid pending settlement, a temporary class 
facilitates notice to those persons whom the court might consider 
  
part of the class.  The expanded notice afforded by access to the 
customary class action notification process protects both the 
absentees and the defendants by eliminating negotiations between 
the defendants and the named plaintiffs with respect to the class 
definition that could leave the defendant vulnerable to 
additional suits by absentees whose interests, a court later 
determines, were not adequately served or protected.  2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE § 11.27 at 11-40 (citing Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Sellers, 101 B.R. 921 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)).  Increasing the 
certainty that the settlement will be upheld augments the value 
of settling to the defendant and consequently the amount 
defendants will be willing to pay.  Thus, delaying certification, 
in contravention of a strict reading of Rule 23, encourages 
settlement, an important judicial policy, by increasing the 
prospective gains to the defendant (and thus potentially to the 
plaintiffs as well) from exploring a negotiated solution.  
 Moreover, critics of settlement classes may 
underestimate the safeguards that still inhere.  Although courts 
are often certifying settlement classes with sub-optimal amounts 
of information, and without the full benefit of the processes 
meant to protect the absentees' interests, the provisional 
certification of a settlement class does not finally determine 
the absentees' rights.  When the simultaneous notice of the class 
and the settlement is distributed to the proposed class, 
objecting class members can still challenge the class on 
  
commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation, superiority, 
and predominance grounds -- they are not limited to objections 
based strictly on the settlement's terms.  2 NEWBERG & CONTE §11.27 
at 11-40 (citing Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sellers, 101 B.R. 
at 921).  
 Furthermore, the view that, in settlement class cases, 
the court lacks the information necessary to fufill its role as 
protector of the absentees, may reflect an assumption that the 
court's approval always comes early in the case.  See 2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE § 11.27 at 11-43 to 11-44.  While it often does, the 
certification decision is sometimes made later in the case, when 
the parties have presumably developed the merits more fully (in 
discovery or in the course of wrangling over the settlement 
terms) and when prior governmental procedures or investigations 
might have also yielded helpful information.  Id.  Whatever the 
timing of the certification ruling, the judge has the duty of 
passing on the fairness and adequacy of the settlement under Rule 
23(e) and also of determining whether the class meets the Rule's 
requisites under 23(a).11  Whether or not the court certifies the 
class before settlement discussions, these duties are the same.  
2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27, at 11-46.   
 Although a judge cannot presume that the putative class 
counsel actively represented the absentees' interests, the court 
                     
11
.  We are somewhat dubious of the court's ability to discharge 
its duties completely under these circumstances.  See Part IVE 
infra. 
  
can still monitor the negotiation process itself to assure that 
both counsel and the settlement adequately vindicate the 
absentees' interests.  Thus, there is no reason to inflexibly 
limit the use of settlement classes to any specified categories 
of cases (for example, those cases with few objectors, those 
which do not involve partial settlements,12 or those which do not 
involve an expanded class).  Even apparently troublesome 
litigation activity, such as expanding the class just before 
settlement approval at the defendant's request, is no more free 
from judicial scrutiny in a settlement class context than it 
would be otherwise.  The court still must give notice to the now-
expanded class and satisfy itself that the requisites of class 
certification are met.  Id. at 11-49.  Since the party advocating 
certification bears the burden of proving appropriateness of 
class treatment, David v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974), 
where the procedural posture is such that the court lacks 
adequate information to make those determinations, it can and 
should withhold the relevant approvals.  2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27 
at 11-46. 
 But even if the use of settlement classes did reduce a 
judge's capacity to safeguard the class's interests, it does not 
necessarily impair the ability of absentees to protect their own 
                     
12
.  MCL 2d expressed concern about partial settlements 
(settlements only as to certain plaintiffs or certain defendants) 
since "[m]embers of the settlement class will almost certainly 
find it difficult to understand their position in the 
litigation."  MCL 2d § 30.45.  
  
interests.  Individual class members retain the right to opt out 
of the class and settlement, preserving the right to pursue their 
own litigation. See Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. N.E.C.A., Inc., 
814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (criticizing settlement classes 
because they create opportunities for one-way intervention).  In 
fact, the use of the settlement class in some sense enhances 
plaintiffs' right to opt out.  Since the plaintiff is offered the 
opportunity to opt out of the class simultaneously with the 
opportunity to accept or reject the settlement offer, which is 
supposed to be accompanied by all information on settlement, the 
plaintiff knows exactly what result he or she sacrifices when 
opting out.  See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27 at 11-51.  See In re 
Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d at 174.  
 In sum, settlement classes clearly offer substantial 
benefits.  However, the very flexibility required to achieve 
these gains strains the bounds of Rule 23 and comes at the 
expense of some of the protections the Rule-writers intended to 
construct.  As Judge Schwarzer has explained: 
 one way to see [the settlement class] is as a 
commendable example of the law's adaptability to meet 
the needs of the time -- in the best tradition of the 
Anglo-American common law.  But another interpretation 
might be that it is an unprincipled subversion of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  True, if it is a 
subversion, it is done with good intentions to help 
courts cope with burgeoning dockets, to enable 
claimants at the end of the line of litigants to 
recover compensation, and to allow defendants to manage 
the staggering liabilities many face.  But as 
experience seems to show, good intentions are not 
always enough to ensure that all relevant private and 
public interests are protected.  The siren song of Rule 
  
23 can lead lawyers, parties and courts into rough 
waters where their ethical compass offers only 
uncertain guidance. 
William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions:  
Order Out of Chaos, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 D.  Are Settlement Classes Cognizable Under Rule 23? 
 Although not specifically authorized by Rule 23, 
settlement classes are not specifically precluded by it either; 
indeed, Judge Brieant has read subsection (d), giving the court 
power to manage the class action, as authorizing the creation of 
"tentative", "provisional", or "conditional" classes through its 
grant of power to modify or decertify classes as necessary.   
See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 478-79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).  And because of the broad grant of authority in 
Rule 23(d), at least one commentator has noted that the validity 
of temporary settlement classes is usually not questioned.  2 
NEWBERG & CONTE §11.22 at 11-31.  Courts apparently share this 
confidence.  Indeed, one court believed that "[i]t is clear that 
the Court may provisionally certify the Class for settlement 
purposes."  South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 749 F.Supp. 1419, 
(D.S.C. 1990).    
  
 We believe that the "provisional"13 or "conditional"14 
conception of the settlement class device finds at least a 
colorable textual basis in the Rule.  Rule 23(d) enables a court 
to certify a class, if it complies with its duty to assure that 
the class meets the rule's requisites by making appropriate Rule 
23 findings (see Part IV(E) infra).  Some courts appear to have 
concluded that the built-in flexibility of the Rule, which 
enables the court to revisit the requisites and modify or 
decertify the class should its nature change dramatically during 
the negotiation process, renders it acceptable to determine class 
status after settlement and thus avoid scrutinizing and 
adjudicating class status at an earlier stage when the outcome is 
unknown.  See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United, 105 F.R.D. at 483; In 
re Beef Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 177 ("[T]he Court finds 
that a conditional class should be certified for the purpose of 
considering the proposed settlements.")   
 Alternatively, some courts have conceived of settlement 
classes as a "temporary assumption" by the court to facilitate 
settlement.  See Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680; In re Beef Indust. 
                     
13
.  The terms "tentative" and "provisional" appear to be used 
interchangeably. 
14
.  "Conditional" is actually a term that can be properly 
applied to all class actions, even those that are certified in 
the normal process.  Under Rule 23(c)(1), the court retains the 
authority to re-define or decertify the class until the entry of 
final judgment on the merits.  This capacity renders all 
certification orders conditional until the entry of judgment.  
See MCL 2d § 30.18. 
  
Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 177; 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27 at 11-
50.  The arguments of the late Herbert Newberg, one of the 
leading advocates of settlement classes, reflect an assumption 
that the Rule 23 determinations are merely postponed, not 
eliminated: 
 On analysis, however, it would appear that this 
argument [that courts using settlement classes 
circumvent the need to test the propriety of the class 
action according to the specific criteria of Rule 23] 
may be rebutted by perceiving the temporary settlement 
class as nothing more than a tentative assumption 
indulged in by the court . . . .  The actual class 
ruling is deferred in these circumstances until after 
hearing on the settlement approval . . . .  At that 
time, the court in fact applies the class action 
requirements to determine whether the action should be 
maintained as a class action . . . . 
2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27 at 11-50.15  Newberg posits, therefore, 
that the temporary assumption conception of the settlement needs 
no special authorization since the court eventually follows the 
ordinary certification process, only deferring it until the 
settlement approval stage.   
 Courts have also relied on the more general policies of 
Rule 23 -- promoting justice and realizing judicial efficiencies 
-- to justify this arguable departure from the rule.  
                     
15
.  See also In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. 
Supp. 1379, 1388 n.13 (D. Md. 1983) ("Completely ancillary to the 
proposed settlement, [a temporary settlement class] lasts only as 
long as the period betwen the preliminary approval of the 
settlement and the court's final determination on the settlement.  
In effect, a temporary settlement class serves only as a 
procedural vehicle for providing notice to putative members of a 
proposed class . . . ."). 
  
 [T]he hallmark of Rule 23 is flexibility . . . . 
Temporary settlement classes have proved to be quite 
useful in resolving major class action disputes.  While 
their use may still be controversial, most Courts have 
recognized their utility and have authorized the 
parties to compromise their differences, including 
class action issues through this means. 
Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 72-73.  One commentator found implicit 
authorization for settlement classes under a settlement-oriented 
interpetation of Rule 23: 
 [Rule 23] provides that a court may certify a common 
question class action when it will prove "superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy."  A judicially 
supervised and approved class action settlement, like a 
judicially supervised trial, is a means of hearing and 
determining judicially, in other words "adjudicating," 
the value of claims arising from a mass tort.  As a 
result, if conditional certification of the case as a 
common question class action for settlement purposes 
would enhance the prospects for a group settlement, 
then Rule 23 authorizes certification.  
Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litig., 70 
CORNELL L. REV. 779, 835 (1985) (footnotes ommited). 
 It is noteworthy that resistance to more flexible 
applications of Rule 23 has diminished over time.  See In re 
Taxable Mun. Bond Secur. Litig., 1994 WL 643143, *4 (E.D. La. 
1994) (commenting upon this trend).  The evolution of the 
reception accorded settlement classes has manifested itself in 
the successive versions of the Manual for Complex Litigation.  
The first edition of the Manual criticized the initiation of 
settlement negotiations before certification, and discouraged all 
such negotiations.  See MCL 1st § 1.46.  The second edition 
  
recognizes the potential benefits of settlement classes but still 
cautioned that "the court should be wary of presenting the 
settlement to the class."  MCL §30.45 at 243.  The (draft) third 
version acknowledges that "[s]ettlement classes offer a commonly 
used vehicle for the settlement of complex litigation" and aims 
only to supervise rather than discourage their use.  See MCL § 
30.45 at 192.   
 A survey of the caselaw confirms the impression that 
resistance to settlement classes has diminished:  few cases since 
the late 1970's and early 1980's even bother to squarely address 
the propriety of settlement classes.  Moreover, no court of 
appeals that has had the opportunity to comment on the propriety 
of settlement classes has held that they constitute a per se 
violation of Rule 23.  See, e.g., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. 
Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding no prohibition 
but granting absentees standing to appeal settlement approval); 
Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 
1977) (describing how court approved combined notice of the 
pendency of the class and the terms of the proposed settlement); 
In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 223 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (upholding settlement despite pre-certification 
negotiations with some defendants); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982); Mars Steel, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 
1987) (criticizing settlement classes but ultimately approving 
  
settlement).  But some courts recognize that this practice 
represents a significant departure from the usual Rule 23 
scenario and thereby counsel that courts should scrutinize these 
settlements even more closely.   
 We acknowledge that settlement classes, conceived of 
either as provisional or conditional certifications, represent a 
practical construction of the class action rule.  Such 
construction affords considerable economies to both the litigants 
and the judiciary and is also fully consistent with the 
flexibility integral to Rule 23.  A number of other jurisdictions 
have already accepted settlement classes as a reasonable 
interpretation of Rule 23 and thereby achieved these substantial 
benefits.  Although we appreciate the concerns raised about the 
device, we are confident that they can be addressed by the 
rigorous applications of the Rule 23 requisites by the courts at 
the approval stages, as we discuss at greater length herein.  For 
these reasons, we hold that settlement classes are cognizable 
under Rule 23. 
E.  Are the Rule 23(a) and (b) Findings Required for 
Settlement Classes?  Does Finding the Settlement 
to Be Fair and Reasonable Serve as a Surrogate for the Findings? 
 There is no explicit requirement in Rule 23 that the 
district judge make a formal finding that the requisites of the 
rule have been met in order to certify a class.  However, most 
district judges have routinely done so, assuming that it was 
required, and in published opinions, a number of courts have 
  
endorsed or at least acknowledged the compelling policy reasons 
for doing so.  See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 
(3d Cir. 1985); Plummer, 668 F.2d at 659; Interpace Corp. v. 
Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1971); MCL 2d § 30.13 
("The judge should enter findings and conclusions after the 
hearing, addressing each of the applicable requirements of Rule 
23(a) and (b).").  For example, where there has been some dispute 
over certification, a court should give the litigants, 
particularly the absentees, some statement of the reasons for its 
decision.  Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 785.  Articulated findings also 
simplify the review of complex cases generally.  Id.  With 
respect to settlement classes, we hold that courts must make the 
findings because the legitimacy of settlement classes depends 
upon fidelity to the fundaments of Rule 23.16   
 Inasmuch as collusion, inadequate prosecution and 
attorney inexperience are the paramount concerns in pre-
certification settlements, see Malchman, 706 F.2d at 433; Beef, 
607 F.2d at 174, the need for the adequacy of representation 
finding is particularly acute in settlement class situations, 
given the inquiry's purpose of detecting cases where there is a 
"likelihood that the litigants are involved in a collusive suit 
                     
16
.  This conclusion is supported by the text of Rule 23(e).  
That section provides that "class action" may not be compromised 
without court approval, and arguably a case is not a "class 
action" in the absence of such findings.   
  
. . . ." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d 
Cir. 1968).   
 There appears to be no authority contra this practice.  
Indeed, the courts and commentators that have endorsed settlement 
classes have seemed to assume that the approving court made the 
requisite class determinations at some point.  For example, 
Newberg's argument rebutting the charge that the "tentative 
assumption" of class status by the court to foster settlement 
evades the Rule's strictures continues:   
 
 The actual class ruling is deferred in these 
circumstances until after [the] hearing on the 
settlement approval, following notice to the class.  At 
that time, the court in fact applies the class action 
requirements to determine whether the action should be 
maintained as a class action . . . .   
2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.27 11-50.  See also Whitford v. First 
Nationwide Bk., 147 F.R.D. 135, 142 (WD Ky. 1992) (disregarding 
even the possibility that these classes would not have to meet 
all of the normal certification requisites).  Even the cases 
where the courts did not recognize a need to make the 
determinations demonstrate a heightened concern for fairness and 
a more cautious approach to settlement approval.  See Ace Heating 
& Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(court must be doubly careful where negotiation occurs before 
certification and designation of a class counsel); Mars Steel, 
834 F.2d at 681 (applying a higher standard of fairness); Simer 
v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 664-66 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring a higher 
  
demonstration of fairness); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 
69 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasizing the extensive discovery and 
ability and experience of counsel).   
  Some courts have certified settlement classes "without 
articulating or consciously applying Rule 23 tests."  2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE § 11.27 at 11-52.  See, e.g., Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681 
(suggesting that the certification procedure may not be  
necessary to combat the potential for abuse created by the use of 
settlement classes since that potential is "held in check by the 
requirement that the judge determine the fairness of the 
settlement . . ."); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d at 73 
(determination that proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and 
adequate substitutes for Rule 23 findings); In re Beef Antitrust 
Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177 (5th Cir. 1979); City of Detroit v. 
Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting 
contention that the court erred when it approved a settlement and 
acquiesced in the settlement's assumption of the existence of a 
proper class).  Some courts neglecting the findings have taken 
the view that the notice of proposed settlement, which must be 
preliminarily approved by the court, "carries the necessary 
implication that the action complies with Rule 23."  Beef, 607 
F.2d at 177.   
 We disagree both with this suggestion and with the 
conclusion that a fairness determination is a surrogate for Rule 
  
23 findings.17  Even if we set aside the problem of the court's 
inadequate information, the inquiry into the settlement's 
fairness cannot conceptually replace the inquiry into the 
propriety of class certification.  Normally, a court makes the 
required commonality and typicality determinations by referencing 
the original class complaints in order to assure that the claims 
alleged by the named plaintiffs are common to the class (although 
the class need not share every claim in common, Hassine v. 
Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1988)), and that the claims 
alleged by the named plaintiff occupy approximately the same 
position of centrality to the named plaintiffs as they do to the 
rest of the class.  Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).  Neither the 
existence of a settlement nor the terms of settlement affect the 
nature of this important inquiry.   
 The Rule 23(a) class inquiries (numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) 
constitute a multipart attempt to safeguard the due process 
rights of absentees.  Thus, the ultimate focus falls on the 
                     
17
.  We note in this regard that other courts have made the 
determinations of adequacy of representation and homogeneity of 
the class when evaluating the fairness of the settlement for the 
express purpose of assuring that they possess enough information 
to execute their Rule 23(e) duty.  See In re Beef Industry 
Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 173 n.4 (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:  PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Federal 
Judicial Ctr. 1977)); see also In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 
F.R.D. 475, 483 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) (making findings in the opinion 
which preliminarily approved the settlement). 
  
appropriateness of the class device to assert and vindicate class 
interests.  Conversely, however, the process of negotiation does 
not reveal anything about commonality and typicality.  One might 
argue that these requisites are merely means to the end of 
vindicated rights, and that observing the process of negotiation 
could demonstrate adequate vindication -- the true aim of the 
Rule.  In our view, a court cannot infer that the rights of the 
entire class were vindicated without having assured that 
commonality and typicality were satisfied.   
 The 23(b)(3) determination is also important in the 
regulatory scheme.  To be certified as a (b)(3) class, the judge 
must determine that "questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).18  But the 
settlement approval inquiry is far different from the 
certification inquiry.  In settlement situations, the superiority 
requirement arguably translates into the question whether the 
settlement is a more desirable outcome for the class than 
individualized litigation, and  may assure that the settlement 
has not grossly undervalued plaintiffs' interests.  But even if 
                     
18
.  As the case before us involves a damages class under Rule 
23(b)(3), we do not address the application of the (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) requisites which, without the important right to opt out, 
involve different considerations. 
  
this is so, a point we neither concede nor decide, there remains 
the concern about conflicts between those appointed to represent 
class interests -- the lawyers and named plaintiffs -- and the 
rest of the class.  These concerns, particularly acute with 
settlement classes, concentrate the focus of the certification 
inquiries on the representational elements. 
 Certainly, evaluating the settlement can yield some 
information relevant to the adequacy of representation 
determination under 23(a)(4).  The settlement evaluation involves 
two types of evidence:  a substantive inquiry into the terms of 
the settlement relative to the likely rewards of litigation, see 
Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73; Protective Comm. for Indep. 
Stockholders v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163 
(1968), and a procedural inquiry into the negotiation process.  
The focus on the negotiation process results from the realization 
that a judge cannot really make a substantive judgment on the 
issues in the case without conducting some sort of trial on the 
merits, exactly what the settlement is intended to avoid. See 
Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d at 433.  Instead, the court 
determines whether negotiations were conducted at arms' length by 
experienced counsel after adequate discovery, in which case there 
is a presumption that the results of the process adequately 
vindicate the interests of the absentees.  Weinberger, 698 F.2d 
at 74; City of Detroit v. Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 463; Baldwin-
United, 105 F.R.D. at 482 ("In order to supplement judicial 
  
examination of the substance of a compromise agreement, and 
because a court cannot conduct a trial in order to avoid a trial, 
attention must be paid to the process by which a settlement has 
been reached.").   
 Although the procedural focus on the fairness 
determination yields information pertinent to the adequacy of 
representation inquiry, it cannot fully satisfy the inquiry.  
That is because reliance on the negotiation process used to 
approve the settlement to satisfy the class certification 
requirements puts excessive pressure on the settlement approved 
determinations, and, more fundamentally, such a reliance may be 
circular.  Cf. NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.28 at 11-54 (suggesting a 
greater need for a court to carefully articulate if reasons for 
settlement approval where the class was not separately 
certified).   
 Courts approving settlements have examined the 
negotiating process in light of the "experience of counsel, the 
vigor with which the case was prosecuted, and the coercion or 
collusion that may have marred the negotiations themselves."  
Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 
Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73; Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 465.).  Some of 
these courts have suggested that the fact that vigorous, arm's 
length negotiations occurred should allay concerns about adequacy 
of representation.  But these inferences depend on the implicit 
assumption that the lawyers actually negotiating really were 
  
doing so on behalf of the entire class, see 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 
11.28 at 11-59, assumptions which are clearly unjustified in a 
context where the potential for intra-class conflict further 
emperils the class's representation.  Far too much turns on the 
adequacy of representation to accept it on blind faith.   
 Without determining that the class actually was 
adequately represented, the district judge has no real basis for 
assuming that the negotiations satisfactorily vindicated the 
interests of all the absentees.  The focus on the negotiation 
process also cannot address the part of the adequacy of 
representation inquiry intended to detect situations where the 
named plaintiffs are unsuitable representatives of the absentees' 
claims.  To state that class members were united in the interest 
of maximizing over-all recovery begs the question.  Although that 
observation might allay some concern about a conflict between the 
attorney and the class, a judge must focus on the settlement's 
distribution terms (or those sought) to detect situations where 
some class members' interests diverge from those of others in the 
class.  For example, a settlement that offers considerably more 
value to one class of plaintiffs than to another may be trading 
the claims of the latter group away in order to enrich the former 
group.  
 In short, the prophylactic devices used by judges to 
approve these pre-certification settlements without ever formally 
certifying the class fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.  
  
Without determining that the class claims are common and typical 
of the entire putative class and that the class representatives 
and their counsel are adequate representatives, we have no 
assurance that the district court fully appreciated the scope and 
nature of the interests at stake.19  Finally, we note that courts 
adopting the view that the formal class determinations are not 
necessary for settlement classes may be contravening not only the 
language of the rule but also the Supreme Court's requirement in 
General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 
102 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1982) (disapproving the trial court's 
insufficient scrutiny of the named plaintiff's capacity to 
adequately represent the class), that "[a]ctual, not presumed, 
conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable."  
Thus, while we approve the provisional certification of a 
                     
19
.  In Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d at 433, the court was 
satisfied by the district court's determination that the 
settlement class satisfied the adequacy of representation inquiry 
noting:  "There is no doubt that the district court must make an 
independent evaluation of whether the named plaintiffs were 
adequate representatives of the class . . . .  A judge has an 
obligation to consider whether the interest of the class are 
adequately represented." (citing East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-06, 97 S.Ct. 189, 96-98 
(1977)); see also Plummer, 668 F.2d at 659 & n.4.  We agree that 
this is an appropriate focus given the heightened potential for 
collusion, buy-offs and other abuses in settlement class 
situations where the negotiations occur before the court appoints 
class representatives and counsel.  We still believe, however, 
that  courts should assure that settlement classes meet all of 
the requirements of 23(a) and (b).  This prescription is 
consistent with the heightened duty of courts in class action 
settlements to assure that the absentees' rights are adequately 
protected.     
  
settlement class to facilitate settlement discussions, final 
settlement approval depends on the finding that the class met all 
the requisites of Rule 23. 
F.  Can There be a Valid Settlement Class That 
Would Not Serve as a Valid Litigation Class? 
 As we have previously explained, courts using the 
settlement class device must at some point definitively certify 
the class and satisfy themselves that the requisites of Rule 23 
have been satisfied.  To avoid that process entirely would 
dismantle the rule's carefully constructed mechanism that serves 
to protect absentees' due process rights.  Moreover, despite some 
courts' suggestions that the standards are less rigorous for 
settlement classes, we do not believe that Rule 23 authorizes 
separate, liberalized criteria for settlement classes.   
 At the outset we note that, while some other courts 
have nominally complied with the rule, they appear to have 
assumed that lower standards apply in settlement class cases.  
See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 
688 F.2d 615, 633 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217, 
103 S. Ct. 1219 (1983) ("[C]ertification issues raised by class 
action litigation that is resolved short of a decision on the 
merits must be viewed in a different light."); Fisher Bros. v. 
Phelps Dodge Indus. Inc., 604 F. Supp. 446, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1985); 
In re Dennis Greenman Securities Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1543 
(11th Cir. 1987) ("In reviewing settlement certifications, a 
special standard has been employed."); A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 
  
740 (in deciding whether to certify a class, settlement is at 
least an important factor in favor and might even be a per se 
ground for certification);  Manual.2d at §30.45.  Other courts 
have stated that settlement reduces the potential conflicts among 
the class and thus enhances the likelihood of meeting the 
criteria, presumably the same criteria a litigation class must 
satisfy.  See, e.g.,  Bowling v. Pfhizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 
159 (S.D. Oh. 1992).  Newberg is of this view.  See 2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE §11.28, at 11-58.   
 According to Newberg, though settlement does not impact 
the numerosity requirement it may indeed increase the likelihood 
of meeting the commonality and typicality inquiries.  "Typicality 
of claims in a settlement class context requires proof that the 
interests of the class representative and the class are commonly 
held for the purposes of receiving similar or overlapping 
benefits from a settlement."  2 NEWBERG & CONTE §11.28 at 11-58.  
On this theory, because the court has delayed the findings until 
the outcome of the litigation (i.e., the settlement agreement) is 
known, the judge conducts the inquiry based on the relative 
rewards to the class members rather than based on the various 
legal claims of class members.  So long as all plaintiffs get 
similar benefits from the settlement, irrespective of the 
different strengths of their initial claims, the commonality and 
typicality inquiries are viewed as likely to be satisfied. 
  
 Under this approach, the adequate representation 
inquiry is also simplified in the settlement class context by a 
result-oriented approach toward the class requirement findings.  
Rather than asking whether the lawyers have sufficient resources 
and skills to prosecute the action (as would be the case with 
customary class certification procedures), courts, it is said, 
need only determine, in hindsight, whether the settlement was 
negotiated at arms' length, and whether the negotiations were 
long, thorough and deliberative.  See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981) (adequacy 
judged by sufficiency of settlement); In re Domestic Air Transp. 
Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 341 (N.D. Ga. 1993) 
(inequitable distribution).  Courts adopting this approach 
require proof only that named plaintiffs' and class interests are 
not antagonistic.  See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 
F.2d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 1985) (relying on absence of conflict to 
find adequate representation); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 
(3d Cir. 1982) (finding named plaintiff an adequate 
representative despite small stake in litigation and ignorance of 
facts and claims); Steiner v. Equimark Corp., 96 F.R.D. 603, 610 
(W.D. Pa. 1983) ("The key question [for the adequacy of 
representation inquiry] is whether their interests are 
antagonistic.").  In these cases, courts have effectively relied 
  
on the settlement's terms -- the outcome of the action -- to find 
the required absence of antagonism.20   
 We disagree with this approach, championed primarily by 
Newberg.  There is no language in the rule that can be read to 
authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement 
classes.21  Although we acknowledge the need for flexible 
interpretation of Rule 23 to enable it to achieve its broader 
purposes of vindicating difficult individual claims and 
conserving judicial resources, see Beef, 607 F.2d at 177-78 
(discussing the policy needs for flexibility); Ace Heating, 453 
F.2d at 33 (recognizing need to give small claimants who did not 
                     
20
.  For example, in finding adequate representation, one court 
noted:  "[S]o long as all class members are united in asserting a 
common right, such as achieving the maximum possible recovery for 
the class, the class interests are not antagonistic for 
representation purposes." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶63, 163 at 77,788 n. 10 (S.D. 
Tex. 1979), aff'd, 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing WRIGHT & 
MILLER, FED. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1768, at nn.7 & 8).   
21
.  Indeed, if any difference in standards is warranted, pre-
certification settlement may raise the adequacy of representation 
standard.  Since this inquiry must ascertain "whether there has 
been any collusion or undue pressure by the defendants on would 
be class representatives," see First Comm. Corp. of Boston 
Consumer Accts. Litig., 119 F.R.D. 301, 308 (D. Mass 1987); 
Alvarado Partners LP v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 546 (D. Colo. 
1989), it must carry greater weight in the settlement class 
context where there is an enhanced potential for those evils.  
Thus, while the other 23(a) findings remain important when the 
action settles, the need to assure an absence of collusion and an 
alignment of interests assumes an especially crucial role.  
Reliance, for the class requisites analysis, on the settlement's 
terms and process also increases the importance of an independent 
conclusion of adequate representation (i.e., one not derived 
solely by reference to the nature of the negotiations). 
  
opt out the right to appeal a settlement approval), we emphasize 
that Rule 23 is designed to assure that courts will identify the 
common interests of class members and evaluate the named 
plaintiff's and counsel's ability to fairly and adequately 
protect class interests.  See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 
F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir. 1974).  Thus, actions certified as 
settlement classes must meet the same requirements under Rule 23 
as litigation classes.  To allow lower standards for the 
requisites of the rule in the face of the hydraulic pressures 
confronted by courts adjudicating very large and complex actions 
would erode the protection afforded by the rule almost entirely. 
 Judge Posner has explained the animating concern behind 
this strict application.  "The danger of a premature, even a 
collusive, settlement is increased when as in this case the 
status of the action as a class action is not determined until a 
settlement has been negotiated, with all the momentum that a 
settlement agreement generates . . . ." Mars, 834 F.2d at 680.    
 The foregoing discussion has focused on adequacy of 
representation, but the presence of commonality and typicality 
are equally important to the class action regime.  Certifying a 
class without the existence of questions common to the class (or 
where the class representatives' claims are not typical) perverts 
the class action process and converts a federal court into a 
mediation forum for cases that belong elsewhere, usually in state 
court.  On the other hand, the cases that make the settlement 
  
class device appear most useful are cases presenting the most 
unwieldy substantive and procedural issues, i.e., those diversity 
cases in which plaintiffs from many states are confronted with 
differing defenses, differing statutes of limitations, etc. -- 
precisely those cases that stretch the Rule to its outer-most 
limits.   
 This is a troublesome issue -- and a close one.  Many 
mass tort actions have this problem.  The School Asbestos cases 
and the Breast Implant cases had it, and this case does, as well.  
It may initially seem difficult to envision an actual trial of 
these cases because of the differing defenses certain to be 
raised under the various bodies of governing law.  While the 
problem may be overstated,22 settlement classes still serve the 
useful purpose of ridding the courts -- state and federal -- of 
this albatross even though the case may never have been triable 
in class form.  But if that were the primary function of the 
settlement class, the federal courts would have become a 
mediation forum, a result inconsistent with their mission and 
limited resources.  In sum, "a class is a class is a class," and 
a settlement class, if it is to qualify under Rule 23, must meet 
                     
22
.  In the School Asbestos case, 789 F.2d at 996, the panel 
asked counsel to analyze all the claims and defenses and write a 
report reflecting whether the differing claims and defenses 
evidence a small number of patterns that would be amenable to 
trial through a series of special verdicts.  The plaintiffs came 
up with a demonstration that the claims and defenses were 
reducible to four patterns.  That, in our view, was sufficient to 
satisfy the commonality and typicality inquiries.  The same might 
be true in this case. 
  
all of its requirements.  The district court should keep these 
matters in mind on remand. 
V.  IS THE SETTLEMENT CLASS PROPER HERE? 
 A.  Were There Adequate Findings Under Rule 23(a)? 
 Certain of the objectors in this case contend that the 
district court committed plain error by never actually certifying 
the class as required by Rule 23.  See Brief of French Objectors 
at 18.  This, of course, would be a serious error, since without 
certification there is no class action, and "[i]n a settlement 
entered without class certification the judgment will not have 
res judicata effect on the claims of absent class members."  
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 1981).  
 The district court certified the class provisionally in 
a pre-trial order.  See Pretrial Order No. 7.  We have already 
noted that provisional certification constitutes an acceptable 
means of facilitating settlement negotiations.  See 2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE §11.27 at 55-56.  It appears that the court believed that 
it certified the class by "confirming" the provisional 
certification in its order approving the settlement.  (JA 1708, 
1745.)  However, the court did not make the findings we hold that 
Rule 23 requires, not even upon approving the settlement.  
Because we hold today that courts employing settlement classes 
must still make findings that the class complies with Rule 23(a) 
and the appropriate parts of Rule 23(b), the court's failure to 
comply with the rule in this respect is a plain error of law, and 
  
hence an abuse of discretion, requiring that the certification be 
set aside. 
 Our conclusion that the settlement class was not 
properly certified does not mean that the class could not be 
certified on remand.  Accordingly, we must consider whether the 
existing record is adequate to support class certification, or 
whether further record development is required. 
B.  Could the Class Requisites Have Been Met 
On The Current Record? 
1.  Numerosity, Commonality, and Typicality 
 As we have explained, a class action -- whether 
certified for settlement or litigation purposes -- must meet the 
class requisites enunciated in Rule 23.  The district court did 
not make findings on these issues.  The numerosity requirement of 
Rule 23(a) is plainly satisfied in this action encompassing 
nearly six million truck owners.  The commonality and typicality 
inquiries of 23(a), however, raise substantial concerns about the 
sufficiency of this class.  The record currently lacks the facts 
needed to establish these requisites, and the defendants also 
ardently maintain that the applicability of different defenses to 
different groups of plaintiffs would prevent the class from 
satisfying the commonality and typicality requirements.  At this 
juncture, we leave open the possibility that, on remand, the 
district court may indeed find facts sufficient to support these 
elements. 
  2.  Adequacy of Representation 
  
   a.  The Situation of the Fleet Owners 
 This settlement class appears to fail to meet Rule 
23(a)'s adequacy of representation test.  The adequacy of 
representation inquiry has two components intended to assure that 
the absentees' interests are fully pursued:  it considers whether 
the named plaintiffs' interests are sufficiently aligned with the 
absentees, and it tests the qualifications of the counsel to 
represent the class.  See Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 
811 (3d Cir. 1984); 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.28 at 11-58.  On the 
first prong, we are not satisfied that the interests of various 
class members were sufficiently aligned; indeed the settlement 
appears to create antagonism within the class.  While some courts 
have been satisfied that there is no intra-class conflict where 
"all class members are united in asserting a common right, such 
as achieving the maximum possible recovery for the class," In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
63, 163 at 77, 788 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd. 643 F.2d 195 
(5th Cir. 1981), we disapprove such a myopic focus on the 
settlement terms.   
 In this case in particular, the conclusion that the 
settlement -- that (supposedly) maximized class recovery -- 
satisfied the requirement that class members' interests not be 
antagonistic ignores the conspicuous evidence of such an intra-
class conflict in the very terms of this settlement.  The 
substantial impediments to fleet owners using these certificates 
  
creates a conflict between their interests in this settlement and 
those of individual owners. (The named plaintiffs are all 
individual owners.)  Moreover, the dubious value of the transfer 
option, see Part VI(A)(1)(c) infra, one of the principal 
responses to the fleet owners' objection, does little to reduce 
the disparity in the prospective value to the different sections 
of the class.  
 This is not a case where some plaintiffs share the 
prospect of a future claim with other class members who currently 
have such a claim.  The fleet owners will never enjoy the 
benefits of the settlement terms, such as the intra-household 
transfer option, intended specifically for the benefit of 
individual owners.  Thus, we must be concerned that individual 
owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the 
government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement 
to their own benefit.  Not surprisingly, the settlement leaves 
fleet owners with significantly less value than individual 
owners.  At the very least, the class should have been divided 
into sub-classes so that a court examining the settlement could 
consider settlement impacts that would be uniform at least within 
the sub-classes. 
   b.  Did Counsel Adequately Represent the 
    Interests of the Entire Class? 
 The other aspect of the adequacy of representation 
test, whether counsel is qualified and serves the interests of 
  
the entire class, also gives us reason to pause.  Courts 
examining settlement classes have emphasized the special need to 
assure that class counsel:  (1) possessed adequate experience; 
(2) vigorously prosecuted the action; and (3) acted at arms 
length from the defendant.  See, e.g., Malchman, 706 F.2d at 433; 
Alvarado Partners, 723 F. Supp. at 546.  The first criterion is 
no problem, for these counsel clearly possess the experience and 
skills to qualify them to pursue these sorts of actions.  But the 
second and third points require attention in view of lack of 
significant discovery and the the extremely expedited settlement 
of questionable value accompanied by an enormous legal fee. 
 Before addressing the latter points, it is necessary to 
begin with some legal theory discussing the structural nature of 
fee arrangements in class actions of this type, having in mind 
that even honorable counsel -- like class counsel here -- may be 
compromised by the possibility of a large fee. 
  (1)  Class Action Attorneys' Fees 
   Theory and Structure  
 Beyond their ethical obligations to their clients, 
class attorneys, purporting to represent a class, also owe the 
entire class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed.  
See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.65 at 11-183; Greenfield v. Villager 
Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d. Cir. 1973).  The large fees 
garnered by some class lawyers can create the impression of an 
ethical violation since it may appear that the lawyer has an 
  
economic stake in their clients' case.  But class actions cannot 
be analyzed in the same framework as conventional bipolar 
litigation.  Because of the collective action problems associated 
with cases where individual claims are relatively small, WRIGHT, 
MILLER & KANE, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1754 at 49, and 
the social desirability of many class suits (the private 
enforcement model), id. at 51; Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc. 
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), large attorneys' fees serve to 
motivate capable counsel to undertake these actions.  Thus, large 
fee awards standing alone do not suffice to show that the 
representation was inadequate or unethical.  These allowances 
generally reflect the realization that the lawyer represents 
numerous individuals with somewhat varying interests, not an 
acceptance of the situation where the lawyer's personal interests 
trump the interests of the entire class.   
 Some commentators blame the system of compensating 
class action lawyers in a manner that fails to confront fully the 
differences between class action litigation and classical bipolar 
litigation for creating incentives that diverge markedly and 
predictably from their clients' interests.  The leading critic is 
Professor Coffee.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the 
Plaintiff's Attorney:  The Implications of Economic Theory For 
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1986) (noting that critics "have 
argued that the legal rules governing the private attorney 
  
general have created misincentives that unneccessarily frustrate 
the utility of private enforcement.  These critics have focused 
chiefly on the conflicts that arise between the interests of 
these attorneys and their clients in class and derivative actions 
. . . .") (hereinafter Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney); 
Id. at 677 ("Ultimately, the most persuasive account of why class 
actions frequently produce unsatisfactory results is the 
hypothesis that such actions are uniquely vulnerable to collusive 
settlements that benefit plaintiff's attorneys rather than their 
clients."); John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney 
General:  Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not 
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful 
Champion:  The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 
SUM LAW & CONTEM. PROBS., 5 Summer 1985; Kevin M. Clermont & John D. 
Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 
(1978); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic 
Analysis of the Contingency Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).  
 Economic models have shown how conventional methods of 
calculating class action fee awards give class counsel incentives 
to act earlier than their clients would deem optimal.  See 
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
at 688.  Because, under a percentage of recovery award mechanism, 
the attorney will only enjoy a relatively small portion of 
whatever incremental award he can extract from the defendant, the 
  
defendant can pressure the plaintiffs' attorney into early 
settlement by threatening to expend large sums on dilatory 
tactics that would run the expenses up beyond what plaintiffs' 
attorneys can expect to profit.  Id. at 690.  Rather than 
presenting a possible solution, the lodestar method seemingly 
exacerbates the problem of cheap settlement by divorcing the fee 
award from the settlement's size, since plaintiffs' attorneys 
have no incentive to take the risk on a trial for potentially 
larger award to the class where their own fees will not 
necessarily reflect the greater risk taken on trial.  See also 
id. at 718 (discussing how lodestar method may create structural 
collusion).   
 Coffee also blames the principal-agent problem endemic 
to class actions for creating a situation where the defendants 
and plaintiffs can collusively settle litigation in a manner that 
is adverse to the class's interest:  "At its worst, the 
settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap 
settlement for a high award of attorney's fees.  Although courts 
have long recognized this danger and have developed some 
procedural safeguards intended to prevent collusive settlements, 
these reforms are far from adequate to the task."  Id. at 714 
n.121 (citing cases).  A number of commentators have identified 
settlements which afford only nonpecuniary relief to the class as 
prime suspects of these cheap settlements. See Coffee, 
Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney, 86 COLUM. L. REV. at 716 
  
n.129; JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, The Plaintiffs' 
Attorneys Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 45 n.10 (1991); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class 
Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 n.40 (1993). 
 While courts may fail to appreciate adequately the 
distinction between conventional bipolar litigation and class 
actions in many respects, they may over-emphasize these 
differences in other respects.  To be sure, courts will be 
willing to award fees in class actions that would appear 
extraordinary and arguably improper in conventional litigation.  
Nevertheless, some of the critiques based on ethical or collusive 
concerns remain instructive.  Although subsequent versions seem 
to avoid a discussion, the Manual for Complex Litigation (First) 
acknowledged the potential for attorney-class conflict.  It 
condemned fees that are paid separate and apart from the 
settlement funds paid to the class because amounts "paid by the 
defendant(s) are properly part of the settlement funds and should 
be known and disclosed at the time the fairness of the settlement 
is considered."  MCL 1st § 1.46.  
 One court has noted that the "effect of such an 
arrangement [where the counsel fees are not resolved and the 
details not included in the class notice] may be to cause counsel 
for the plaintiffs to be more interested in the amount to be paid 
as fees than in the amount to be paid to the plaintiffs." In re 
  
General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange, 594 F.2d at 1131.  
Commentators have also noted how, where there is an absence of 
objectors, courts lack the independently-derived information 
about the merits to oppose proposed settlements.  See Coffee, 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, 86 COLUM. L. REV. at 714 
n.131.  Of course, by endorsing a practice where the class is, 
for practical purposes, deprived of information concerning the 
fees, courts foster a situation where there will be fewer 
objectors.23 
  (2)  The Stewardship of Counsel Here 
 A number of factors militate against the conclusion 
that the class's interests were sufficiently pursued here.  
First, the settlement arguably did not maximize the class 
members' interests.  Every owner received a coupon whose value 
could only be realized by purchasing a new truck.  Significant 
obstacles existed to the development of a secondary market in the 
transfer certificates given that the transfer restrictions and 
their limited lifespan minimize the value of the transfer option.  
Second, class counsel effected a settlement that would yield very 
substantial rewards to them after what, in comparison to the $9.5 
million fee, was little work.  
                     
23
.  The information on fee agreements may prompt potential 
objectors to oppose not only the awards but, also, to the extent 
they conclude arm's length negotiations were compromised, the 
adequacy of the settlement and the propriety of the class. 
  
 Third, the fact that the settlement involves only non-
cash relief, which is recognized as a prime indicator of suspect 
settlements, increases our sense that the class's interests were 
not adequately vindicated.  The separate negotiation of the fee 
agreement and the failure to disclose the amount of the award in 
the class notice only enhance this sense that counsel may have 
pursued a deal with the defendants separate from, and perhaps 
competing for the defendant's resources with, the deal negotiated 
on behalf of the class.  And although the degree to which a 
settlement hurts a defendant is not ordinarily a measure of the 
settlement's adequacy, the fact that this settlement might 
actually benefits GM by motivating current owners to buy new 
trucks from the company (the settlement may arguably be viewed as 
a GM sales promotion device) certainly does little to allay the 
concern that the settlement did not advance the interests of the 
class as much as it might have.  
 Fourth, our concern about the vigor of counsels' 
prosecution of the class claims, specifically the possibility 
that counsel did not do right by the class, is buttressed by the 
legacy of Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d 
Cir. 1977).  In Prandini, this court recognized the potential for 
attorney class conflicts where the fees, while ostensibly 
stemming from a separate agreement, were negotiated 
simultaneously.  We characterized simultaneity of fee and 
settlement negotiations as a "situation . . .  having, in 
  
practical effect, one fund divided between the attorney and 
client."  To respond to this danger of collusion between the 
class counsel and defendant, Prandini and the Third Circuit Task 
Force Report on court awarded attorney's fees disapproved fee 
discussions until after the achievement and approval of 
settlement.  See Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021; Court Awarded 
Attorney's Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 
F.R.D. 238, 266 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force].24   
 In this case, there were strong indications that such 
simultaneous negotiations in fact transpired.  Indeed, there was 
evidence in a letter from class counsel that at least some 
portion of the fees and expenses had to have been negotiated 
simultaneously with the settlement.  (Butler Letter on fees, 
Jenkins app. at 70-1).  The court justified its dismissal of the 
allegation of simultaneous negotiation by citing (1) a statement 
in the letter that the "attorneys' fees were negotiated 
separately, after we agreed on everything else," and (2) GM's 
                     
24
.  Other courts and authorities have followed this guide.  See, 
e.g., Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 
1986); MCL 2d § 30.41; 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.29 at 11-62 
(recognizing potential for conflict where settlement and fees to 
be paid by defendant simultaneously negotiated).  To implement 
this prophylactic bar fully, courts would have to require class 
counsel to disclose all understandings as to fees, not simply 
concluded, formal agreements.  See MCL 2d § 34.42 at 237-39.  
Although it recognized that this prophylactic rule could impede 
some settlements by making it impossible for the defendant to 
size up its total liability (i.e. the sum of the settlement 
amount and any fees the defendant agrees to pay), Task Force 108 
F.R.D. at 267-69, the Task Force concluded that avoiding the 
conflicts justified this cost.   
  
reservation of the right to contest any award of fees that it 
deemed unreasonable.  Even though we assume that these are 
factual findings, thus ordinarily deserving deference, we think 
these findings were made by reference to an erroneous legal 
standard.  Indeed, neither of these bases is persuasive, 
especially in view of GM's acquiecence in a patently baseless 
ground for augmenting the counsel fee, see Part VII infra. 
 In considering the adequacy of representation, we are 
loath to place such dispositive weight on the parties' self-
serving remarks.  And even if counsel did not discuss fees until 
after they reached a settlement agreement, the statement would 
not allay our concern since the Task Force recommended that fee 
negotiations be postponed until the settlement was judicially 
approved, not merely the date the parties allege to have reached 
an agreement.  We recognize that Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 
734-38, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1541-43 (1986), overruled Prandini's 
strict rule prohibiting simultaneous negotiations.  However, many 
of the concerns that motivated the Prandini rule remain, and we 
see no reason why Jeff D. or its underlying policy of avoiding 
rules that impede settlement preclude us from considering the 
timing of fee negotiations as a factor in our review of the 
adequacy of the class' representation.  Consequently, the 
likelihood that the parties did negotiate the fees concurrently 
  
with the settlement in this case increases our concern about the 
adequacy of representation.25  
 Nor would GM's reservation of the right to appeal the 
fee award establish that the fee was negotiated separately since 
the likelihood that GM would want to contest an award based on a 
fee petition to which it agreed is quite small.   The fact is 
confirmed by GM's "lay down" position with respect to the fee 
application.  Although the Supreme Court clearly invalidated the 
use of mulitipliers in lodestar awards in 1992, see City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992), GM did not apprise 
the district court of this fact when it was approving the fee 
award, or complain when the district court used a mulitplier in 
the calculations.  This posture of GM suggests that its 
reservation of the right to appeal the fee award should not be 
given great weight in determining whether the settlement and 
attorney's fee were negotiated separately.  But we hasten to add 
that we have not resolved these factors.  We only hold today that 
the court did not make the necessary findings, and we remand to 
the district court so that it can make the necessary Rule 23 
findings.  
 The thrust of the foregoing discussion is that the 
circumstances under which the settlement evolved, made possible 
by the settlement class device, may have compromised class 
                     
25
.  While the parties could have sought a waiver permitting 
simultaneous negotiations, Task Force at 269, the parties did not 
seek one here.    
  
counsel in a manner raising doubts as to adequacy of 
representation.  The district court will examine this aspect of 
the matter on remand.  Perhaps, on a more developed record, the 
adequacy of representation will be established.  These concerns 
underscore the importance of having the district court make Rule 
23 findings.  Although we do not believe that the class would 
meet the requirements for certification on the current record, we 
do not preclude the possibility that certification could be 
properly supported on a more developed record.  Thus, we remand 
this action to the district court so that it can re-examine the 
class certification and the settlement and, if appropriate, 
certify the class by making the findings required by Rules 23(a) 
and (b). 
VI.  IS THE SETTLEMENT FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE? 
 Invoking the correct standard of review under Girsh v. 
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975), the objectors also 
argue that the district court abused its discretion, when it 
approved the settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate.  
Because we leave open the possibility that the district court may 
on remand properly certify the class pursuant to Part V of this 
opinion, we must also address the district court's approval of 
the settlement.  Rule 23(e) imposes on the trial judge the duty 
of protecting absentees, which is executed by the court's 
assuring that the settlement represents adequate compensation for 
the release of the class claims.  See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.46 at 
  
11-105 to 11-106.  Some courts have described their duty under 
Rule 23(e) as the "fiduciary responsibility" of ensuring that the 
settlement is fair and not a product of collusion.  In re Warner 
Commun. Secur. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986); see also, 
Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Alvarado Partners L.P. 
v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 546 (D. Colo. 1989).  At all events, 
where the court fails to comply with this duty, absentees have an 
action to enjoin the settlement.  2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.23.   
 In order for the determination that the settlement is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate "to survive appellate review, the 
district court must show it has explored comprehensively all 
relevant factors."  Malchman, 706 F.2d at 434 (citing Protective 
Committee, 390 U.S. at 434; Plummer, 668 F.2d at 659).  A number 
of courts have recognized the need for a special focus on 
precluding the existence of collusion.  See Malchman, 706 F.2d at 
433 (advocating a focus on the negotiation process to uncover 
possible collusion); General Motors Interchange, 594 F.2d at 1125 
(finding a need for heightened scrutiny of the settlement 
stemming from the potential for collusive settlement). 
 The topic of class action settlement has received much 
attention, which is understandable given the growing frequency of 
the settlement of increasingly large claims through the class 
action device.  See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 739-40 
  
(4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the use of the device to settle 
various mass tort cases); In re Taxable Municipal Bond Secur. 
Litig., 1994 WL 643142 at *5 (noting the dramatic change in 
attitudes of courts and commentators toward the settlement 
class).  The drive to settle class actions has also grown, 
notwithstanding the potential for collusive settlements to 
compromise absentee interests.  Courts undertaking the special 
role of supervising class action settlements are apparently 
heeding the public  policy in favor of settlement, see 2 NEWBERG & 
CONTE § 11.41 at 11-85, and acknowledging the urgency of this 
policy in complex actions that consume substantial judicial 
resources and present unusually large risks for the litigants.    
 We have already noted the special difficulties the 
court encounters with its duties under Rule 23(e) in approving 
settlements where negotiations occur before the court has 
certified the class.  Because of such difficulties, many courts 
have required the parties to make a higher showing of fairness to 
sustain these settlements.  See, e.g., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. 
v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[W]hen the 
settlement is not negotiated by a court designated class 
representative the court must be doubly careful in evaluating the 
fairness of the settlement to the plaintiff's class."); General 
Motors Interchange, 594 F.2d at 1125 (attributing a need for 
heightened scrutiny of the settlement to the potential for 
collusive settlement); Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73 (higher showing 
  
of fairness required in pre-certification settlements and special 
focus on assuring adequate representation and the absence of 
collusion); Malcham v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 434 (2d Cir. 1983); 
Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 
681 (7th Cir. 1987); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting 
Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1323 (2d Cir. 1990);   2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 
11.23; MCL 2d § 30.42 (citing the informational deficiencies 
faced by the court and counsel in pre-certification settlements).  
We affirm the need for courts to be even more scrupulous than 
usual in approving settlements where no class has yet been 
formally certified.    
 Settlements that have survived this heightened standard 
have involved much stronger indications of sustained advocacy by 
the de facto class counsel than we observe in this case.  See 
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) (settlement 
discussions did not commence until after four years of discovery 
supplemented by another investigation by a trustee and after 
plaintiffs rejected the first settlement offer); In re Beef 
Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 177-78 (settlement 
discussions began after six months of discovery; action pending 
for three years, court was fully briefed); City of Detroit v. 
Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving settlement 
after several counsel vied for position for four years and voiced 
strenuous objections, explaining that Manual's concerns about 
settlement classes articulated by the Manual for Complex 
  
Litigation only pertained to settlement in the early stages of 
litigation); cf. Plummer v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (rejecting settlement where plaintiffs' counsel relied 
on information voluntarily furnished by defendants).    
 There are certain basic questions that courts can ask 
to detect those cases settled in the absence of sustained effort 
by class representatives sufficient to protect the interests of 
the absentees.  See MCL 2d § 30.41.  For instance:  Is the relief 
afforded by the settlement significantly less than what appears 
appropriate in light of the preliminary discovery?  Have major 
causes of action or types of relief sought in the complaint been 
omitted by the settlement?  Did the parties achieve the 
settlement after little or no discovery?  Does it appear that the 
parties negotiated simultaneously on attorneys' fees and class 
relief?  Even acknowledging the possibility of some overpleading, 
these questions raise a red flag in this case. 
 With the courts' heightened duty to scrutinize this 
pre-certification settlement and some of these rudimentary 
indicators in mind, we now apply our nine-factor Girsh test, see 
Part III supra, and conclude from the balance of these factors 
that the district court's conclusion that the settlement was fair 
and  reasonable constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
Coincidentally, this result tracks the conclusions of a Texas 
appeals court that, based on an analysis similar to that of 
Girsh, set aside an order approving a substantially identical 
  
settlement of similar claims brought by residents of Texas.  See 
Bloyed v. General Motors, 991 S.W. 2d at 422.  
 A.  Adequacy of Settlement - General Principles 
 This inquiry measures the value of the settlement 
itself to determine whether the decision to settle represents a 
good value for a relatively weak case or a sell-out of an 
otherwise strong case.  The Girsh test calls upon courts to make 
this evaluation from two slightly different vantage points.  
According to Girsh, courts approving settlements should determine 
a range of reasonable settlements in light of the best possible 
recovery (the eighth Girsh factor) and a range in light of all 
the attendant risks of litigation (the ninth factor).  See Girsh 
v. Jepson, 521 F.2d at 157;  see also Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 
426,  433 (2d Cir. 1983) (identifying a similar test); City of 
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(same).   
 In formulaic terms we agree that "in cases primarily 
seeking monetary relief, the present value of the damages 
plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately 
discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should be compared 
with the amount of the proposed settlement." MCL 2d § 30.44  at 
252.  This figure should generate a range of reasonableness 
(based on size of the proposed award and the uncertainty inherent 
in these estimates) within which a district court approving (or 
rejecting) a settlement will not be set aside.  See Newman v. 
  
Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1972). The evaluating court 
must, of course, guard against demanding too large a settlement 
based on its view of the merits of the litigation; after all, 
settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest hopes in 
exchange for certainty and resolution.  See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 
F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 77).  The primary touchstone of this 
inquiry is the economic valuation of the proposed settlement.  
  We turn to this analysis.  As will appear, the district 
court's conclusion that the settlement was within the range of 
reasonableness rests heavily on the proposition that the class 
had never proven any diminution in value of the trucks.  It 
ignored the fact that the coupons provided no cash value and made 
no provision for repairing the allegedly life-threatening defect.  
For the reasons that follow, we believe that the district court 
did not sufficiently scrutinize the valuations of the settlement, 
and that, on this record, the settlement appears to be 
inadequate.  Consequently, we will conclude that the district 
court erred when it found that the settlement fell within the 
range of reasonableness. 
1.  Valuation of the Settlement - Introduction 
 The value of the $1,000 certificates is sharply 
disputed.  GM argues that the certificates are worth close to 
their face value since they can be redeemed for a broad array of 
GM trucks and can be used in combination with dealer incentives.  
For those unable or unwilling to purchase another GM truck, GM 
  
argues, cash can be realized from transferring the certificate 
within the household for full value or selling the certificate 
for $500.  Plaintiffs presented an expert, Dr. Itamar Simonson, 
who placed the value of the certificates between $1.98 and $2.18 
billion, based on an estimate that 34% to 38% of the class would 
redeem the certificate in purchasing a new truck and an 
additional 11% of the class would sell their certificates for 
$500.  Objectors contest these estimates and many of the 
assumptions used to generate them. 
 We therefore analyze several of the foundations for the 
district court's evaluation.  First, we inquire about the 
reliability of plaintiffs' witness's valuation.  Second, we 
explore the adequacy of the district court's consideration of the 
possibility that some class members would not be able to use the 
coupons at all.  Third,  we inquire as to whether the quite 
significant restrictions on transfer of the certificates present 
obstacles to the development of a market so as to render the 
estimates of their worth unreasonably inflated.  Finally, we 
consider whether the size of the attorneys' fees agreement 
suggests that GM attached a greater value to the class claims 
than proponents of the settlement would have us believe.  These 
factors lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the district 
court over-valued this settlement, which in turn gives credence 
to the contention of the objectors that the proffered settlement 
was, in reality, a sophisticated GM marketing program. 
  
 a.  Plaintiffs' Witness Dr. Itmar Simonsen 
 Dr. Simonsen's methods and assumptions raise serious 
doubts about the reliability of the valuations they generated.  
Although Simonsen's conclusion was based on his estimate that 
between 34% and 38% of the class members would use the 
certificate, his own telephone survey revealed that only 14% of 
the class reported that they would "definitely" or "probably" buy 
a new truck.  Apparently Simonsen only excluded those who 
responded that they would "definitely not buy" or "probably not 
buy" a new truck, a methodological choice which is questionable.  
Furthermore, Simonsen discounted the statistics by seemingly 
arbitrary factors in an effort to be "conservative," but without 
some basis or explanation for deriving those factors, we have no 
way of judging whether they were conservative or aggressive.   
 Even more importantly, the raw survey data probably 
over-state the prospects that the certificates will be used since 
there are substantial obstacles to obtaining and transferring the 
certificates, none of which Simonsen deals with.  Finally, 
Simonsen supposed that a higher percentage of fleet owners would 
redeem the certificates, but this seems to disregard the 
statutory and regulatory constraints that often restrict fleet 
buyers' purchase decisions.  Indubitably all of these concerns 
reduce the value of the settlement, yet Simonson appears simply 
to have multiplied his estimated number of users by the coupon 
amount or transfer value. 
  
 On the other hand, although various objectors have made 
a good argument that the net value of the certificates will also 
be eroded by rising truck prices (which would allegedly be 
influenced both by the huge number of certificates that would 
need to be redeemed within a relatively brief time and by the 
fact that dealers may take advantage of customers they know to be 
somewhat tied to the purchase of a GM truck by their desire to 
realize value from the coupon), we will, to be conservative, not 
take this factor into account.  Even so Simonsen's methodology 
undermines his conclusion to the extent that his valuation cannot 
support the settling parties' case. 
 b.  Inability of Class Members to Use Certificates 
 The district court also erred by not adequately 
accounting for the different abilities (not inclinations) of 
class members to use the settlement.  One sign that a settlement 
may not be fair is that some segments of the class are treated 
differently from others.  See Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d at 
1329; In re GM Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d at 1128; 
MCL 2d § 30.41 at 236.  Consequently, the fact that the coupon 
settlement benefits certain groups of the class and not others 
suggests that the district court did not adequately discharge its 
duties to safeguard the interests of the absentees.  See In re 
Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(ongoing duty of the judge to protect absentees); Piambino v. 
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1329 (duty to assure the settlement is 
  
fair, reasonable and adequate with respect to each category of 
the class). 
 People of lesser financial means will be unable to 
benefit comparably from the settlement.  GM cites a number of 
other judicially approved class action settlements that awarded 
coupons and argues that, since this coupon provides far more 
consideration, it necessarily merits approval.  See, e.g., New 
York v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) ($5 discount coupon for video game purchase approximately 
$200); In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 1983-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65 at 680 (D. Conn. 1983) (discount coupons 
with maximum value of $100 for machines costing approximately 
$100 to $300); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 
F.R.D. 297, 331 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (certificates worth between $10 
and $200 for flights costing between $50 and $1500).  
 These cases, however, differ dramatically in the amount 
of money required to purchase the good -- i.e. to realize the 
certificate's value -- and in the frequency with which a typical 
consumer might expect to purchase the good.  Whether a new truck 
costs between $20,000 and $33,000 as some objectors claim (JA 
1884, 1889-90, 2210) or some amount "far less" than that, as GM 
claims, this purchase is not comparable to buying a new food 
processor or even an airline ticket.  As the district court 
acknowledged, "a substantial number of class members" (Op. at 18) 
would not be able to afford a new truck within the fifteen month 
  
coupon period.  Both the high cost of the trucks and the 
infrequency of a consumer's purchase of a new truck (relative to 
the fifteen month redemption period) make using these 
certificates significantly more difficult than those in the other 
coupon settlements, for all class members but particularly for 
the poorer ones.   
 Even where class members do manage to use the 
certificates, we are concerned about their real value.  It may 
not be the case that the certificates saved those class members 
$1,000 on something they would have otherwise bought; those class 
members may only have purchased new GM trucks because they felt 
beholden to use the certificates.  Thus, rather than providing 
substantial value to the class, the certificate settlement might 
be little more  than a sales promotion for GM, in just the way 
that the Bloyed court characterized the settlement as a 
"tremendous sales bonanza" for GM.  Bloyed v. General Motors 
Corp., 881 S.W. 2d at 431.  
 We turn then to the fleet buyers, who constitute a 
readily identifiable category of plaintiffs arguably 
disadvantaged by the settlement.  Budgetary constraints prevent 
some of them from replacing their entire fleets within the 
fifteen month redemption period.26  Competitive bidding 
                     
26
.   This is true of, for example, the State of Iowa, State of 
Indiana, West Virginia Department of Transportation, State of New 
York, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
and Department of General Services, County of Los Angeles, 
California, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and the City of New 
York. 
  
requirements also apparently impede many of these entities from 
being able to use the certificates.  Because there is no 
assurance that GM will be the lowest bidder, the government 
entities bound by these requirements may not be able to use the 
certificates.  See, e.g. The Louisiana Public Bid Law, LA. R. 
STAT. § 38:2212(A)(1)(a).  [Jefferson Parish Brief at 5].  The 
district court dismissed these objections saying it was 
"confident that ingenious counsel will be able to structure 
bidding requirements so that the governmental entities can take 
full advantage of the certificates." (Op. at 26.)  The district 
court's observation, while perhaps partially accurate, represents 
far too cavalier a dismissal of a potentially serious intra-class 
and conflict inequity. 
 The named plaintiffs argue that, if certain fleet 
buyers and individuals were dissatisfied with the settlement's 
terms, they could simply opt-out of the class and pursue their 
own relief individually.  (Plaintiff's Brief at 15 n.13.)  While 
such an argument might theoretically be true, it ignores the 
realities of pursuing small claims.  It would cost considerably 
more to litigate individual claims than the litigant could 
recover, using either a retrofit or a warranty theory to measure 
damages.  And the district court apparently did not consider the 
possibility of a subclass of fleet owners, though that might 
alter the anatomy of the settlement.  At all events, the right of 
parties to opt out does not relieve the court of its duty to 
  
safeguard the interests of the class and to withhold approval 
from any settlement that creates conflicts among the class.  In 
sum, the relative inability of class members to use the 
certificates militates against settlement approval. 
 c.  Value of the Transfer Option 
 In order to support its conclusion that the settlement 
was reasonable and fair, the district court cited the ability of 
fleet buyers and those consumers with budget constraints to 
realize value from the certificates by transferring them.  We 
believe the value of the transfer option is dubious, and 
consequently that the settlement was unfair to substantial 
portions of the class.   
 Simonsen's valuation of the settlement includes $157 
million attributable to transferred certificates.  Simonsen 
calculated that holders of the certificates could realize $250 
from the sale of the transferred certificates (with a $500 face 
value). He gave no explanation for his assumption of a $250 
market value.  To the extent that this methodology is also 
dubious, it compounds the skewing of the valuation wrought by his 
usage estimates, see Part VI(A)(1)(a) supra.  
 The value of this option depends on the development of 
a secondary market for these certificates.  But there is no 
assurance that a market will develop; indeed, the restrictions on 
transfer, which GM claims are necessary to prevent fraud, pose 
significant barriers to the creation of such a market.  The 
  
requirement that holders send in their $1,000 or original 
certificate to exchange for the $500 transfer certificate imposes 
very significant transaction costs since the parties must agree 
on a price before the original holder initiates the transfer 
process (which could easily last several weeks).  During that 
process, there is substantial market risk, for the price of the 
transfer certificate could well move dramatically and induce a 
breach in the purchase agreement by one of the parties.  Breaches 
would pose a real problem in this case because the transfer 
certificate cannot be reissued in another's name and thus cannot 
be resold.  Because of these risks, individuals will be quite 
reluctant to contract for these transfer certificates.  Even 
worse, the one-time transfer restriction also precludes the 
development of a market making clearing house mechanism.  In our 
view, therefore, it is quite possible that holders will be unable 
to realize any significant value from the transfer option.   
 Aside from the effect of the transfer restrictions, we 
also question Simonsen's valuation on the basis that it did not 
account for the inability to use the transfer certificates in 
conjunction with other incentive plans.  For example, the 
incremental value of the $500 transfer certificate to class 
members would be completely eroded if GM offers a $1,000 dealer 
rebate program, since the class member would be forced to choose 
between the plans and would therefore be no better off then the 
general public. 
  
 The district court did not take cognizance of these 
factors.  It erred when it presumed development of a liquid 
market for these transfer certificates with very little support 
in the record for it, and when it relied on a putative value of 
the transfer option arbitrarily ascribed by plaintiffs' expert to 
find that the settlement was fair and reasonable.  Although 
objectors might have made out an even stronger case by proffering 
their own expert on this valuation, the court has an independent 
duty to scrutinize the settlement's value and any evidence 
offered to support it.  Accordingly, we find that evidence 
pertaining to the incremental value created by the transfer 
option does not support the valuation of the settlement. 
 d.  GM's Implicit Valuation of the Claim 
 Our concerns about the adequacy of the settlement are 
complicated by the generous attorneys' fees GM agreed to pay in 
this case.  Although originally GM vigorously contested the 
viability of the class claims and the class, the company, in view 
of its willingness to pay attorneys' fees of $9.5 million, may, 
at the time of settlement, have valued the claims at some 
substantial multiple of the fee award.27  This $9.5 million 
                     
27
.  GM was apparently so eager to have this $9.5 million fee 
approved that its counsel did not even object when the district 
court applied a multiplier notwithstanding clear Supreme Court 
precedent invalidating the use of multipliers.  See City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2638.  In our view, the fact 
that counsel to this large multinational corporation did not 
object to this clear error raises a smoking gun signaling GM's 
awareness of the questionable settlement it made.   
  
attorney's fee award seems unusually large in light of the fact 
that the settlement itself offered no cash outlay to the class. 
GM's apparent willingness to pay plaintiffs' counsel close to 
$9.5 million indicates that the party in perhaps the best 
position to evaluate the claim may have thought the action, which 
both plaintiffs' counsel and the defense contend was not worth 
much, posed a significant enough threat to cause GM to strike a 
lucrative deal with plaintiff's counsel.   
 On the other hand, perhaps GM's valuation results only 
from the class counsel's decision to settle the action at an 
early stage and GM's desire to encourage that decision.  Of 
course, a decision to settle that occurs at too incipient a stage 
of the proceedings also weighs against settlement approval.  In 
short, while the settlement certainly presented difficult 
valuation issues, we believe that the district court erred when 
it uncritically accepted such high estimates of the settlement's 
value.   
2.  Valuing This Settlement Relative to The Relief Requested 
 The ninth Girsh factor also undermines the district 
court's decision.  In the class action context, "the relief 
sought in the complaint" serves as a useful benchmark in deciding 
the reasonableness of a settlement.  See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 
F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).  Here the adequacy of the 
certificate settlement is particularly dubious in light of the 
claims alleged and the relief requested in the original 
  
complaint.  The coupons offered by GM simply do not address the 
safety defect that formed the central basis of the amended 
complaint filed barely four months before the settlement.28  The 
district court gave two justifications for its conclusion that, 
notwithstanding this discrepancy, the settlement was fair.  
First, the court explained, "no objector that complains that the 
settlement fails to retrofit the alleged defect has been able to 
come forth with a practical and safe modification for the trucks 
that has been designed, evaluated and tested." (Op at 29.)  
Second, the court also relied on the fact that "[t]he proposed 
class settlement does not affect the rights of settlement class 
members to participate in any recall that NHTSA orders." (Op 34-
35.)   
 Considering the validity of these arguments, we  
conclude that they do not alleviate the substantial concerns 
created by the dramatic divergence of the settlement terms from 
the relief originally sought.  This factor, therefore, 
strengthens our conviction that the settlement was not fair, 
reasonable, or adequate. 
 a.  The Retrofit Issue 
  It is true that there does not appear to be a 
consensus retrofit.  For each of the suggested retrofits -- 
                     
28
.  In the amended consolidated complaint, class counsel 
described the trucks as "rolling firebombs" and estimated that an 
additional 200 deaths would occur unless GM took prompt 
corrective action. (Oral Aug. Trans. 127, 257). 
  
relocation of the gas tank to the spare tire location, 
installation of a tank with a rubber bladder, or installation of 
a metal cage around the gas tank -- there was evidence that the 
retrofit was either ineffective or caused other performance 
problems for at least some model years.  On the other hand, there 
was also evidence supporting the efficacy of various retrofits.  
For instance, GM's own documents considered all three options and 
found that all would enhance the safety of the fuel systems. (JA 
1863-64.)  In addition, there was also potentially damaging 
testimony by Ronald E. Elwell, an engineering analyst at GM for 
fifteen of his twenty-eight years and its chief expert in 
defending the fuel tank location and design on the full-size 
trucks in a number of significant product liability cases, see, 
e.g., Bowman v. General Motors, 427 F.Supp. 234, 236 (E.D. Pa. 
1977).   
 In his deposition, Elwell testified that GM designed a 
retrofit using a steel cage which prevented the gas tanks from 
rupturing in side impact testing.  He further testified that GM 
abandoned the retrofit (knowing, because of its own secret crash 
tests, of the increased fire danger) only because GM feared that 
it would give the public the wrong impression.  (Jenkins App. 
119)  GM attempted to impeach Elwell by characterizing him as a 
"disgruntled," (former) employee.  By way of rehabilitation, 
objectors explain Ellwell's reduced duties as a result of health 
problems.  Whether or not Ellwell's testimony could itself 
  
establish that the steel cage enhances safety, his testimony 
might have been important if the case had proceeded to trial.  As 
a consequence, the district court abused its discretion when it 
summarily dismissed Elwell's testimony.   
 b.  Availability of Other Remedies 
 The district court also relied on the existence of the 
NHTSA recall mechanism and the class numbers' unencumbered right 
to bring personal injury suits to justify its approval of a 
settlement that did not secure any of the equitable relief 
originally requested.  While individual tort suits are not 
barred, the court's approval of this settlement (which does 
nothing to redress the alleged danger) foregoes the opportunity 
presented by the pleadings29 to prevent injuries that tort suits 
can at best address only retrospectively.  More importantly, the 
NHTSA remedy may be extremely limited in that it can only require 
a manufacturer to repair a vehicle first purchased within eight 
calendar years of the investigation.  The court's observation 
that "all the plaintiffs may have statute of limitations problems 
in this action that may be equally as severe or worse than the 
eight year NHTSA limitation" does nothing to increase the value 
of the theoretical access to a NHTSA recall remedy to the owner 
or others who may be injured by the trucks at some future point.  
                     
29
.  The pleadings alleged a dominant control theory which, if 
successful, would have required GM, the manufacturer and 
distributor of these vehicles, to remedy the allegedly 
unreasonable safety defects before they could cause or exacerbate 
the damage and injury resulting from a side impact collision.   
  
Hence, the potential existence of a partial recall under NHTSA 
does not dispel our doubts about the terms of the settlement 
diverging so far from the original complaint.  In so concluding, 
we do not rely on the subsequent resolution of the NHTSA 
investigation, which did not include any recall.  
 In sum, we agree with the district court that the 
evidence of the existence of an effective retrofit to be 
contradictory; nevertheless, we think that the very murkiness of 
this evidence and the fact that certain key evidence was wrongly 
excluded, especially in light of the magnitude of the alleged 
safety defect, militates against approving a settlement attained 
at such an early stage of the litigation which does nothing to 
repair the vehicles, even if only by creating a fund to finance 
retrofits.30 
                     
30
.   The district court also based its conclusion that the 
settlement was reasonable relative to the best possible recovery 
(i.e., relative to the relief requested) on its doubts that a 
court could or should award the recall/retrofit remedy requested.  
The court expressed some doubt that it had the power to order a 
recall by injunction, citing Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 
260 (D.D.C. 1990) and National Women's Health Network Inc. v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mass. 1982).  Neither of 
these cases, however, conclusively establishes that the district 
court would lack the power to order a recall.  The fact that no 
court has done it before and that there may be some logistical 
issues to surmount do not themselves support the court's 
conclusion; other class actions and complex litigation 
settlements have developed mechanisms for supervising and 
enforcing compliance with detailed affirmative injunctions.  See, 
e.g., MCL.2d § 33.55 ("The court may also decide to appoint a 
master under Rule 53 to monitor future implementation of 
injunctive features of the settlement.").  Although we intimate 
no view on the matter, it does seem to warrant further 
consideration.  At all events, the district court could clearly 
have awarded relief that would require GM to set up a fund to 
  
 B.  Complexity of the Suit 
 This factor is intended to capture "the probable costs, 
in both time and money, of continued litigation."  Bryan v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).  By measuring the costs of 
continuing on the adversarial path, a court can gauge the benefit 
of settling the claim amicably.  The district court here 
concluded that the litigation "would be mammoth" and would have 
resulted in a "substantial delay in . . . recovery." (JA 1708, 
1713-14).   
 While it is true, as the Youngs objectors argue, that 
the district court's conclusion in part depended on the ambitious 
definition of the class in terms of both geography and models 
included, (Youngs 25), the action would still involve a complex 
web of state and federal warranty, tort, and consumer protection 
claims even if the class had been subdivided and some of the 
legal issues simplified.  Had the case not been settled, both 
plaintiffs and GM would have had to conduct discovery into the 
background of the six million vehicles owned by class members, 
including any representations allegedly made to plaintiffs.  Each 
side would also have needed to hire or produce a retinue of 
experts to testify on a variety of complex issues.  Undoubtedly, 
(..continued) 
finance retrofits initiated by the owners' individually.  See 
Bloyed, 881 S.W. 2d at 433.  The district court, therefore, did 
not lack the power to order a remedy that would have been more 
responsive to the class's concern about leaving the trucks on the 
road. 
  
GM would have ardently contested the action at every step, 
leading to a plethora of pre-trial motions.  In contrast, this 
settlement made its remedies immediately available and avoided 
the substantial delay and expense that would have accompanied the 
pursuit of this litigation.  The district court thus correctly 
concluded that the complexity factor weighed in favor of 
approving the settlement. 
 C.  Reaction of the Class 
 In an effort to measure the class's own reaction to the 
settlement's terms directly, courts look to the number and 
vociferousness of the objectors.  Courts have generally assumed 
that "silence constitutes tacit consent to the agreement."  Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1313 n.15 (3d Cir. 1993). 
However, a combination of observations about the practical 
realities of class actions has led a number of courts to be 
considerably more cautious about inferring support from a small 
number of objectors to a sophisticated settlement.  See, e.g., In 
re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d at 217-18; GM 
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d at 1137.   
 In a class action case involving securities litigation, 
this court has recognized the possibility that the assumption 
that silence constitutes tacit consent "understates potential 
objectors since many shareholders have small holdings or 
diversified portfolios, . . . and thus have an insufficient 
incentive to contest an unpalatable settlement agreement because 
  
the cost of contesting exceeds the objector's pro rata benefit."  
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d at 1313 n.15.  Although 
this is not a securities class action and the amounts at stake 
could be significant, the absentees may not fully appreciate the 
size of their potential claims since, by excluding those owners 
whose trucks have already experienced some mishap related to the 
fuel tank design, the class may include only those who have no 
reason (outside of media coverage) to know of the latent defect 
or the claim based on the alleged existence of that defect. 
 Even where there are no incentives or informational 
barriers to class opposition, the inference of approval drawn 
from silence may be unwarranted.  As we noted earlier, Judge 
Posner has explained that "where notice of the class action is 
. . . sent simultaneously with the notice of the settlement 
itself, the class members are presented with what looks like a 
fait accompli."  Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681.  In this case 
especially, the combined notice largely defeats the potential for 
objection since the notice did not inform the class that the 
original complaint had sought a retrofit.31  Without information 
about the original complaint, absentees lacked any basis for 
comparing the settlement offered to them to the original prayer.  
                     
31
.   There may also have been other deficiencies in the notice.  
The fact that the notice did not disclose the attorneys fees that 
the class counsel and defendants agreed to, and the fact that the 
notice suggested that class members could also have a recall 
remedy from NHTSA (though many of the trucks were so old that 
NHTSA lacked the power to recall them), may also have helped 
suppress potential objection. 
  
It is instructive that many of the better-informed absentees, the 
fleet owners, did object.   
 The fact that a poll conducted by class counsel's 
marketing expert reported that a minimum of 63% of the class 
would probably or definitely not use the coupon to purchase a new 
truck also suggests that the class could not possibly have so 
wholeheartedly endorsed the settlement.  Moreover, one cannot 
infer approval of the settlement from requests for the transfer 
of the certificates, as the district court did.  Those requests 
only signify that certain class members attempted to maximize the 
value they could realize from the settlement with which they were 
presented and thus might illustrate how futile class members 
thought objecting would be.  
 Although the absolute number of objectors was 
relatively low,32 there are other indications that the class 
reaction to the suit was quite negative:  The seemingly low 
number of objectors includes some fleet owners who each own as 
many as 1,000 trucks, and those who did object did so quite 
vociferously.  In conjunction with the already-noted problems 
associated with assuming that the class members possessed 
adequate interest and information to voice objections, the 
appeals of those who actually objected demonstrate that the 
reaction of the class was actually negative, and not supported by 
                     
32
.  Of approximately 5.7 million class members, 6,450 owners 
objected and 5,203 opted out. 
  
the "vast majority of the class members" as the district court 
concluded. (Op at 8.)  The class reaction factor plainly does 
not, contrary to the district court's conclusion, weigh in favor 
of approving the settlement.  
 D.  Stage of Proceedings 
 The stage-of-proceedings facet of the Girsh test 
captures the degree of case development that class counsel have 
accomplished prior to settlement.  Through this lens, courts can 
determine whether counsel had an adequate appreciation of the 
merits of the case before negotiating.  The district court found 
that this factor favored settlement approval, relying on the fact 
that settlement was presented for approval less than six months 
prior to the scheduled trial date. 
 Given the purpose of this inquiry, however, it is more 
appropriate to measure the stage by reference to the commencement 
of proceedings either in the class action at issue or in some 
related proceeding.  See In re Beef Antitrust, 607 F.2d at 180 
(court referred to discovery in companion cases); City of Detroit 
v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd 
on other grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting the 
extensive discovery in that and parallel cases); In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 105 F.R.D. at 483 (access to expert testimony and 
other evidence from parallel state court proceedings as well as 
to relevant public documents led court to believe counsel 
"availed themselves of all of these sources of information and 
  
conducted full adversarial negotiations. . ."); 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 
11.45 at 11-102 n.247.   
 The relevant period of time this case was in litigation 
was quite brief; approximately four months elapsed from the 
filing of the consolidated complaint to reaching the settlement 
agreement.  To be sure, we cannot measure the extent of counsel's 
effort from the time of the litigation alone; class counsel in 
this case are known to be quite industrious, and the district 
court properly considered class counsel's review of the materials 
from prior product liability proceedings and from the Moseley 
personal injury case, Mosley v. General Motors Corp., No. 90-v-
6276 (Fulton County, Ga. Feb. 4, 1993).  However, mere access to 
the materials from other proceedings does not establish that 
counsel developed the merits, particularly where the other cases 
were premised on different theories of recovery.  While we have 
no doubt that class counsel diligently reviewed those materials 
during the relevant period, nothing in the record demonstrates 
that they had conducted significant independent discovery or 
investigations to develop the merits of their case (as opposed to 
supporting the value of the settlement), that they had retained 
their own experts, or that they had deposed a significant number 
of the individuals implicated in the materials from these other 
proceedings.  It is particularly noteworthy that the plaintiffs 
did not depose Ronald Elwell, although he could potentially have 
  
offered evidence that would have substantially bolstered the 
plaintiffs' case.  See Part VI(A)(2)(a) supra.  
  At all events, the inchoate stage of case development 
reduces our confidence that the proceedings had advanced to the 
point that counsel could fairly, safely, and appropriately decide 
to settle the action.  While the district court may have, 
laudably, been attempting to minimize the funds expended on 
discovery in order to maximize the funds available to the class, 
we think that the district court erred by not assuring that 
adequate discovery had been taken. 
 Beyond the incipient stage of the case and the modest 
indications of substantive development, there is little basis for 
presuming vigorous proscution of the case from the fact that 
settlement negotiations occurred.  In ordinary class action 
settlements (i.e., where the court certifies the class before 
settlement negotiations commence) courts can presume that the 
negotiations occurred at arm's length because they have already 
determined that the counsel negotiating on behalf of the class 
adequately represents the class's interests.  See Part IV(E) 
supra, (discussion of adequacy of representation).  In cases such 
as this one, however, where there has been no determination by 
the court that a proper class exists, the mere fact that 
negotiations transpired does not tend to prove that the class's 
interests were pursued.  Id.  In short, the incipient stage of 
the proceedings poses an even larger obstacle to settlement 
  
approval in settlement class situations than it would in normal 
class action settlements since courts have no other basis on 
which to conclude that counsel adequately developed the claims 
before deciding to settle.   
 Furthermore, to the extent that this stage-of-
proceedings factor also aims to assure that courts have enough 
exposure to the merits of the case to enable them to make these 
evaluations, it cannot support settlement approval here.  With 
little adversarial briefing on either class status or the 
substantive legal claims, the district court had virtually 
nothing to aid its evaluation of the settlement terms.  We 
therefore conclude that the district court clearly erred in 
finding that this factor weighed in favor of settlement approval. 
 E.  Risks of Establishing Liability 
 By evaluating the risks of establishing liability, the 
district court can examine what the potential rewards (or 
downside) of litigation might have been had class counsel elected 
to litigate the claims rather than settle them.  See In re 
Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(comparing advantages of an immediate cash payment with risks 
involved in long and uncertain litigation).  The district court 
here concluded that this factor also weighed in favor of 
approving the settlement since "there appear[ed] to be a 
substantial risk in establishing liability because of the 
complexity and size of the case along with the legal and factual 
  
problems raised by GM." (Op. at 14) (JA 1708).  While we agree 
with the district court that, on balance, the prospective 
difficulty faced by a nationwide class of establishing liability 
favored settlement, we believe the question is much closer than 
it thought, and thus the factors do not weigh heavily in favor of 
settlement as the district court believed.   
 We do not gainsay that the plaintiff class faced 
considerable obstacles in establishing liability.  First, it is 
not clear that the plaintiffs could maintain the federal causes 
of action (the Lanham Act and Magnuson-Moss Act claims) without 
some proof that the trucks suffered some decline in value, which 
the class was unable to demonstrate by published Kelley Blue Book 
figures.  Second, the trucks complied with the applicable federal 
safety standards during the relevant times.  This would 
undoubtedly be strong, though not necessarily conclusive, 
evidence that the trucks were not (legally) defective.  
Statistics offered by GM also suggest that the trucks presented 
no greater risk than other trucks or vehicles.  See (JA 1978, 
2168).  Moreover, data from actual accidents, as opposed to crash 
tests, failed to reveal any statistically significant difference 
in post-collision fires, injuries or death relative to Ford or 
Dodge full-size pickups.  Finally, to the extent that state law 
requires proof of individualized reliance for the 
misrepresentation claims, that would seem to pose a substantial 
  
barrier to proving class-wide liability (though, as noted below, 
that issue can be the subject of separate proceedings). 
 On the other hand, we are not impressed by some of the 
factors relied upon by the district court to support its finding 
of substantial risk in proving liability.  The court cited the 
legal obstacles faced by the class, such as statutes of 
limitations varying in different states, the lack of vertical 
privity for the warranty claims (required in some states), the 
varying expiration of warranty durational limits, and the bar 
under some state laws to recovery for economic losses on tort 
claims. (JA 1708, 1718-22).  In response to these concerns, we 
point out that variations in the state procedural rules 
applicable to the class members have not prevented courts, 
including this one, from adjudicating class claims.  See Hoxworth 
v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 924 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(affirming finding of (b)(3) predominance despite differences in 
state law).  Moreover, even if these variations precluded the 
successful prosecution of the class claims, qua class claims, in 
this case they would not necessarily doom the action to failure.  
 Many of the difficulties posed by these variations 
could have been surmounted (or were more likely to be surmounted) 
if the action were not treated as a national class.  Hence, the 
fact that the only other national automotive product defect class 
action ended in a defense verdict does not weigh heavily in favor 
of settlement.  Indeed, to the extent that state-by-state 
  
variations in procedural laws created legal obstacles, the 
district court should have considered dividing the action into 
geographic sub-classes instead of considering the entire 
nationwide class to be hobbled.  Additionally, the court should 
have considered making the inquiry we made in In re School 
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1110, as to whether the case in 
terms of claims and defenses might fall into three or four 
patterns so that, with the use of special verdict forms, the case 
might have been manageable.   
 We also note that, in other cases, courts have 
certified nationwide mass tort class actions, which also include 
myriad individual factual and legal issues, relying on the 
capacity for a court to decertify or redefine the class 
subsequently if the case should become unmanageable.  See, e.g., 
In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1110 (3d Cir. 1986).  
See also Bruce H. Nielson, Was the Advisory Committee Right?:  
Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of 
Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. at 469 
("Some federal district court judges have suggested that this 
problem could be overcome and that multistate and nationwide 
classes could be certified by . . .  using Rule 23(c)(4) 
subclasses to account for variances in state law . . . ."); see 
infra discussion on Risks of Maintaining Class Status.  In any 
event, the failure of the district court to analyze the 
applicability of these various defenses to the different groups 
  
of plaintiffs may itself constitute an abuse of discretion. See 
Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1329 (5th Cir. 1980) 
("[Vacatur] is demanded by the failure to assess the interests of 
the categories of plaintiffs and whether the settlement was fair, 
adequate and reasonable as to each." (emphasis in original)); see 
also Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112 , 1140 (11th Cir. 1985).    
 In addition, a plethora of other evidence buttressed 
the class claims.  First, the depositions and affidavits from GM 
engineers, including Elwell, characterizing the design as 
indefensible, would have strongly supported the class claims 
notwithstanding the fact that Elwell was arguably vulnerable to 
impeachment on the basis of his own employment history.  Second, 
the evidence from Zelenuk v. GM, No. 96-131262 (Tex. 1992), that 
GM concealed crash tests might have been admitted in this 
proceeding.  Third, the fact that GM has prevailed in three of 
the eight C/K pickup product liability trials does not support 
the settlement by confirming the weakness of the underlying 
claims, for at least two other plausible interpretations could 
explain this statistic.  The fact that plaintiffs prevailed in 
five of the eight actions suggests that the claim alleged here 
was not so weak after all, at least if alleged by suitable 
plaintiffs.  Moreover, such a statistic understates plaintiffs 
recoveries for these types of claims by not accounting for the 
individual settlements that have been reached.    
  
 While we recognize that establishing liability would by 
no means have been easy or certain for the plaintiffs, the 
district court over-emphasized the importance of defenses 
applicable to only some class members under certain state laws 
and incorrectly discounted a significant body of evidence 
pertinent to proving liability.  Therefore, it is not clear that 
plaintiffs faced the grave prospects on the merits that the 
district court apparently believed when it approved this 
settlement.  In any event, the district court's failure to 
distinguish between groups of plaintiffs that did and those that 
did not confront difficult state law defenses constitutes an 
abuse of discretion.  Piambino, 610 F.2d at 1329.   
 
 F.  Risks of Establishing Damages 
 Like the previous factor, this inquiry attempts to 
measure the expected value of litigating the action rather than 
settling it at the current time.  The district court relied 
heavily on this factor in approving the settlement:  "[B]ecause 
the plaintiffs cannot adequately prove diminished value [of the 
pickups], the court concludes that risks of proving damages weigh 
strongly in favor of approval of the proposed class settlement."  
(Op. at 15)(JA 1708, 1722).  We do not share the district court's 
confidence, and conclude that this factor does not weigh strongly 
in favor of settlement. 
  
 GM argues that the class's warranty claim amounts to a 
claim for diminished resale value.  Some United States Courts of 
Appeals and some state courts have rejected such claims either on 
the grounds that a warranty of merchantability does not include 
any guarantee about the product's resale value, see, e.g., 
Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 298 (4th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 904 (1990), or on the basis that 
the tort law of many states precludes tort claims for purely 
economic loss, see GM APPX. tab 14, 3062, 3105.   In assessing 
this Girsh factor, the district court relied on its belief that 
the class could not demonstrate any diminution of the trucks' 
value relative to Ford and Dodge trucks by referring to the 
Kelley Blue Book.   
 We do not, however, believe that this is the only 
permissible approach to measuring the value of the defect.  
According to the Uniform Commercial Code, "the measure of damages 
for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of 
acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special 
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."  UCC 
§ 2-714(2).  Although diminished resale value might represent one 
method of measuring the damage suffered by owners from the 
publicity about the fuel tanks, it does not fully measure the 
difference between the value the defect-free truck would have had 
at delivery and the actual value of the truck as delivered.  
  
Measuring damages with a focus on resale value confounds the 
effects of varying rates of depreciation with the effect of the 
defect on the market value.  The comparisons to the trucks of 
other manufacturers are similarly deficient measures since they 
fail to gauge the effect of the defect on the value of the trucks 
at delivery.   
 The cost of a retrofit, which effectively puts the 
truck in the condition in which it allegedly should have been 
delivered, may constitute an alternative measure of the damages 
arising from the breach of warranty.  It has the advantage of 
avoiding the speculative exercise of ascertaining the 
hypothetical value of defect free trucks.  See, e.g., McGrady v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 818, 821-22 (Ill. App. Div. 
1977) (affirming an award of actual repair expenses where 
measuring value of vehicles as warranted upon delivery would be 
speculative); Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc., 370 S.E.2d 734, 
737 (W. Va. 1988) (reversing a ruling that repair costs were not 
evidence relevant to the value of the goods as accepted).  
Nothing in the UCC precludes such a measure; in fact, § 2-714(1) 
of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
 Where the buyer has accepted goods and given 
notification he may recover as damages for any non-
conformity the loss resulting in the ordinary course of 
events from the seller's breach as determined in any 
manner which is reasonable. 
(emphasis added)(citation omitted).33   
                     
33
.   GM argues that a repair remedy is available only when it is 
less costly to the defendant than diminution in value.  We think 
  
 Because the district court based its determination of 
this factor on its exclusive reference to the Kelley Blue Book 
and refused to consider alternative measures that appear to 
provide concrete (and substantial) damage figures, we believe 
that the court erred in finding that the risks of proving damages 
were so great that they strongly favored settlement approval.  
 G. Risks of Maintaining Class Status 
 The value of a class action depends largely on the 
certification of the class because, not only does the aggregation 
of the claims enlarge the value of the suit, but often the 
combination of the individual cases also pools litigation 
resources and may facilitate proof on the merits.  Thus, the 
prospects for obtaining certification have a great impact on the 
range of recovery one can expect to read from the action.   
 The district court found that this factor favored 
settlement, although it did not place great weight on it.  (Op. 
at 16-17.)   The court cited the "myriad factual and legal 
issues"34 and the vigorous contest waged by GM prior to 
(..continued) 
that such rigid rules are inappropriate, and that the court 
should carefully consider all of the proffered measures of 
damages.  In any event, the costs of retrofit, though unsettled 
by the district court as of this juncture, will be less than the 
diminution in value (if the settling parties' valuation of the 
certificates is any indication of that diminution). 
34
.   The legal issues that might vary among class members 
included the claims of breach of warranty, negligent 
misrepresentation, and negligence and products liability, which 
would be based on the various state laws.  Potentially variable 
factual issues included the fact that the disputed trucks did not 
use a single gas tank design, and the individualized proof of 
  
settlement negotiations as the basis for this finding.  Id.  Two 
observations, which the district court appeared to ignore, weaken 
the basis for its finding that the risk involved in maintaining 
class status favored settlement.   
 First, Rule 23(a) does not require that class members 
share every factual and legal predicate to meet the commonality 
and typicality standards.  Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Indeed, a number of mass tort class actions have been certified 
notwithstanding individual issues of causation, reliance, and 
damages.  See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 
1009.  Because separate proceedings can if necessary, be held on 
individualized issues such as damages or reliance, such 
individual questions do not ordinarily preclude the use of the 
class action device.  See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 
770, 786 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 For example, in School Asbestos, the court certified a 
nationwide (b)(3) class after counsel demonstrated to the court 
how the laws of the 50 states could be reduced to four general 
patterns, providing the framework for sub-classes if the 
nationwide action had proven unmanageable.35  School Asbestos, 
(..continued) 
reliance required in some jurisdictions for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of warranty claims. 
35
.  The district court could retain the sub-classes although 
they might not have properly been brought in that court 
originally.  Cf. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 
F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognizing hypothetical need of 
the court to apply the laws of different states); In re Agent 
  
789 F.2d at 1110.  Although there was no such demonstration in 
this case, we have no reason to doubt that such a demonstration 
would have been possible, for we cannot conceive that each of the 
forty-nine states (excluding Texas) represented here has a truly 
unique statutory scheme, or that all of the model years possessed 
distinct fuel truck designs.  Damage issues, moreover, are not as 
individualized as the district court seemed to assume:  the cost 
of repair could have served as the measure, and that cost would 
not vary much among class members.  Hence, it is quite possible 
that a nationwide class could have been properly certified here.    
  
 Second, even if the action could not be certified as it 
was originally filed, the district court disregarded the 
possibility that there were other ways to aggregate the 
litigation and/or adjudication of these claims.  The court might 
have considered dividing the class into geographic or model-year 
subclasses or allowing the case to continue as a multi-district 
litigation for the remainder of pre-trial discovery.  Each of 
those alternatives could have surmounted some of the individual 
issues while retaining some of the substantive advantages of the 
class action as framed here.  Thus, the court's conclusion that 
this factor favored settlement may have reflected its mistaken 
all-or- nothing approach to certifying this national class.  
(..continued) 
Orange Prod., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (performing choice 
of law analysis). 
  
 Additionally, some of the district court's bases for 
finding such a significant risk in the ability to maintain class 
status undermine our confidence in the appropriateness of the 
district court's certification of the settlement class.  For 
instance, if the district court correctly concluded that there 
were insurmountable barriers to class treatment, it could not 
certify the class for settlement purposes. See Part IV(F) supra. 
It is true that settlement can reduce the differences among class 
members.  But as we have explained, the standard for 
certification is the same for settlement classes as for 
conventional classes.  
 Moreover, if the class members' claims differed so much 
as to preclude certification even of geographic subclasses, a 
settlement that treats all class members alike cannot be adequate 
and fair to all of them.  For reasons stated above, this 
settlement does not even appear to treat all members of the class 
equitably.  See Parts V(B) and VI(A)(1)(b) supra.  Indeed, the 
settlement arguably affords the least relief to those class 
members with the most valuable claims, i.e., the fleet owners.  
See Part VI(A)(1)(b) supra.  The district court's concern, 
therefore, that the class could not maintain its class status, is 
somewhat inconsistent with its certification of the class for 
settlement purposes.36   
                     
36
.  This anomaly is at least partially attributable to the 
court's failure to certify the class in the manner required by 
Rule 23.  But some part of the inconsistency signals that the 
  
 We must agree that this class, even if appropriately 
crafted, confronted significant difficulties in maintaining its 
status in light of the claims alleged.  Nevertheless, we are once 
again left with the impression that the district court too 
hastily approved a settlement because of its perhaps exaggerated 
concern that the quite ambitious initial nationwide definition of 
the class made it too difficult to form a class or group of 
classes capable of litigating these claims. 
 H.  Ability to Withstand Greater Judgment 
 We find no error in the district court's resolution of 
this final Girsh factor -- whether the defendant has the ability 
to withstand a greater judgment.  The district court determined 
that GM "could withstand a judgment greater than the proposed 
settlement," (Op. at 17), although it did not attribute any 
significance to this finding "under these facts."  
 I.  Summary 
 Assuming arguendo that the district court had validly 
certified the settlement class (i.e., properly determined that it 
met the requisites of Rule 23) we hold that the settlement is not 
fair, reasonable, or adequate under the nine factor Girsh test of 
this circuit.  The case was simply settled too quickly with too 
little development on the merits for certificates that may well 
be worth significantly less than the $1.98 to $2.18 billion 
(..continued) 
district court ignored the various ways that the class claims 
could be manageably litigated. 
  
estimate accepted by the district court.  We conclude that the 
district court erred by accepting plaintiffs' witness' estimated 
valuations when those so clearly lacked a sound methodological 
basis and when there were so many other indications -- including 
the inability of fleet owners and less wealthy class members to 
use the certificates, the dubious value of the transfer option, 
and GM's own apparent valuation of the claim -- that the 
settlement was inadequate and unreasonable, and may even have 
been a marketing boon to GM.   
 Additionally, the failure of this settlement to abate 
the lingering safety problem, despite the vociferousness of the 
arguments for some recall or retrofit in the initial complaint, 
enhances our conviction that this settlement is inadequate.  
Beyond its dubious valuation of the settlement, the district 
court also over-estimated the risks of proving liability and 
damages and of maintaining class-status and under-estimated the 
true degree of opposition to the settlement.  The district court, 
however, correctly applied the complexity-of-suit and defendants-
capacity-for-greater-judgment factors. 
 Although we are not bound in any way by the proceedings 
in the separate Texas action, our decision today shares many of 
the concerns expressed by the Texas appellate court which set 
aside an approval of a very similar coupon settlement.  See 
Bloyed, 881 S.W. 2d at 422.  Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which governs class actions, is patterned after 
  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The Bloyed court also was 
concerned about a settlement that provided absolutely nothing to 
those unwilling or unable to purchase another GM truck and that 
did nothing about the allegedly dangerous vehicles left on the 
road.  The Texas court objected as well to the $9.5 million in 
attorneys fees negotiated between that class's counsel and GM. 
 Balancing the Girsh factors, on the current record, 
this settlement clearly fails to meet the standards required for 
judicial approval.  We leave open the possibility, however, that 
the district court on remand might develope the record more 
fully, properly approve the settlement, in either its original or 
a re-negotiated form, and, following the guidance offered by this 
opinion, certify the settlement class.  
VII.  APPROVAL OF THE ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD 
 The French and Young objectors also contest the 
district court's award of attorneys' fees.  (Order Dec. 20, 1993 
and Feb. 2, 1994.)  The court initially awarded fees without an 
independent review of the agreement, explaining its refusal to 
review the award: "[The fee agreement] is a matter of contract 
between the parties, rather than a statutory fee case, . . . and 
payment of the fees will have no impact on the class members 
...." (JA 1772, OP 3)  Subsequently, on February 2, 1994, the 
court issued an "amplification" of its prior ruling, which 
  
justified the award under both the lodestar37 and the percentage 
of recovery38 methods.  Class counsel maintain that the objectors 
lack standing to contest the agreement made between GM and 
themselves, and that the objectors waived their right to appeal 
the award by not raising their objections below.  Although our 
disposition of the certification and settlement approval issues 
obviates the need for a review of the fee award at this stage 
(and moots the waiver question), we highlight some of the primary 
issues in analyzing the appropriateness of a particular fee 
agreement for the district court on remand (in the event that the 
record is expanded, the class certified, and the settlement 
approved). 
 At the outset, we note that a thorough judicial review 
of fee applications is required in all class action settlements.  
The district court did not accommodate practical realities here 
when, rationalizing its initial refusal to review the fee, it 
stated that the fee award was "to be paid by General Motors 
Corporation and will in no way reduce the recovery to any of the 
settlement class members." (JA 1771.)  Indeed, this court has 
recognized that "a defendant is interested only in disposing of 
the total claim asserted against it; . . . the allocation between 
                     
37
.  The lodestar method calculates fees by multiplying the 
number of hours expended by some hourly rate appropriate for the 
region and for the experience of the lawyer. 
38
.  The percentage of recovery method resembles a contingent fee 
in that it awards counsel a variable percentage of the amount 
recovered for the class. 
  
the class payment and the attorneys' fees is of little or no 
interest to the defense."  Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 
1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977); 2 NEWBERG & CONTE § 11.09 (purpose of 
judicial review is to police abuses even where defendant pays 
plaintiff's fees).  In light of these realities, class counsel's 
argument that objectors have no standing to contest the fee 
arrangement is patently meritless:  the fee agreement clearly 
does impact their interests, as it is, for practical purposes, a 
constructive common fund.  
 Moreover, as discussed at length in the adequacy of 
representation section, see Part V(B)(3) supra, the divergence in 
financial incentives present here creates the "danger . . . that 
the lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a 
less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment for 
fees,"  Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 
524 (1st Cir. 1991).  See also Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 
F.2d at 1020 ("When the statute provides that a fee is to be paid 
as a separate item, the conflict between client and attorney may 
not be as apparent . . . .  It is often present nonetheless."). 
This generates an especially acute need for close judicial 
scrutiny of the fee arrangements that implicate this concern.  
See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 224 (2d 
Cir. 1987)  ("The test to be applied is whether, at the time a 
fee sharing agreement is reached, class counsel are placed in a 
position that might endanger the fair representation of their 
  
clients and whether they will be compensated on some basis other 
than for legal services performed."); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 
F.2d at 1139 ("Because of the potential for a collusive 
settlement, a sellout of a highly meritorious claim, or a 
settlement that ignores the interests of minority classes 
members, the district judge has a heavy duty to ensure that . . . 
the fee awarded plaintiffs' counsel is entirely appropriate.").  
We have previously acknowledged that the potential for conflict 
between the class and its counsel is not limited to situations 
meeting the strict definitions of a common fund.39 
  As we have also explained in this opinion, courts must 
be especially vigilant in searching for the possibility of 
collusion in pre-certification settlements.  See Part IV(e) 
supra.  In addition, the court's oversight task is considerably 
complicated by the fact that these attorney-class conflicts are 
often difficult to discern in the class action context, "where 
full disclosure and consent are many times difficult and 
frequently impractical to obtain."  Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 224 
(citations omitted).  Finally, we emphasize that the court's 
oversight function is not limited to detecting "the actual abuse 
[that potential attorney-class conflicts] may cause, but also for 
                     
39
.  The common fund doctrine provides that a private plaintiff, 
or plaintiff's attorney, whose efforts create, discover, 
increase, or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim, 
is entitled to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, 
including attorneys' fees.  Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 
F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977). 
  
potential public misunderstandings they may cultivate in regard 
to the interests of class counsel."  Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 
225 (citing Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 95 
(7th Cir 1977), and Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 
1017 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469; ABA 
Code of Professional Resp. Canon 9 (1975).  On remand, therefore, 
the district court must be alert to the presence in the fee 
agreement of any actual abuse or appearance of abuse capable of 
creating a public misunderstanding. 
   Having emphasized the necessity for judicial review of 
fee awards in all class action settlements, we will briefly 
clarify some principles of fee approval for the district court to 
apply on remand if it certifies a class and approves settlement.   
 Because the district court purported to use both the 
lodestar and the percentage-of-recovery methods, the actual 
grounds for its approval of the fee are not entirely clear.  
Although it is sensible for a court to use a second method of fee 
approval to cross check its conclusion under the first method, we 
believe that each method has distinct advantages for certain 
kinds of actions, which will make one of the methods more 
appropriate as a primary basis for determining the fee.  Here, 
for the reasons that follow, the court should probably use the 
percentage of recovery rather than the lodestar method as the 
primary determinant, although the ultimate choice of methodology 
will rest within the district court's sound discretion.   
  
 The lodestar and the percentage of recovery methods 
each have distinct attributes suiting them to particular types of 
cases.  See Task Force, 108 F.R.D. at 250-53.  Ordinarily, a 
court making or approving a fee award should determine what sort 
of action the court is adjudicating and then primarily rely on 
the corresponding method of awarding fees (though there is, as we 
have noted, an advantage to using the alternative method to 
double check the fee).40 
 Courts generally regard the lodestar method, which uses 
the number of hours resonably expended as its starting point, as 
the appropriate method in statutory fee shifting cases.  Because 
the lodestar award is de-coupled from the class recovery, the 
lodestar assures counsel undertaking socially beneficial 
litigation (as legislatively identified by the statutory fee 
shifting provision) an adequate fee irrespective of the monetary 
value of the final relief achieved for the class.   
 This de-coupling has the added benefit of avoiding 
subjective evaluations of the monetary worth of the intangible 
rights often litigated in civil rights actions.  Outside the pure 
statutory fee case, the lodestar rationale has appeal where as 
here, the nature of the settlement evades the precise evaluation 
needed for the percentage of recovery method.  The lodestar 
                     
40
.  For example, a court can use the lodestar method to confirm 
that a percentage of recovery amount does not award counsel an 
exorbitent hourly rate; similarly, the percentage of recovery 
method can be used to assure that counsel's fee does not dwarf 
class recovery. 
  
method has the added benefit of resembling modes of fee 
determination in conventional bipolar litigation.  On the other 
hand, the lodestar method has been criticized as giving class 
counsel the incentive to delay settlement in order to run up fees 
while still failing to align the interests of the class and its 
counsel, and because it does not rewarding counsel incrementally 
for undertaking the risk of going to trial.  See Coffee, 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, 86 COLUM. L. REV. at 691.  
 Courts use the percentage of recovery method in common 
fund cases on the theory that the class would be unjustly 
enriched if it did not compensate the counsel responsible for 
generating the valuable fund bestowed on the class.  See Task 
Force, 108 F.R.D. at 250.  Because these cases are not presumed 
to serve the public interest (as evidenced by the lack of a fee 
statute), there is no social policy reason that demands an 
adequate fee.  Instead, the court apportions the fund between the 
class and its counsel in a manner that rewards counsel for 
success and penalizes it for failure.  Courts have relied on 
"common fund" principles and the inherent management powers of 
the court to award fees to lead counsel in cases that do not 
actually generate a common fund.  See, e.g., In re Air Crash 
Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(using common fund principles in settlement of consolidated 
cases).  The rationale behind the percentage of recovery method 
also applies in situations where, although the parties claim that 
  
the fee and settlement are independent, they actually come from 
the same source.   
 We believe that this case presents a situation more 
closely aligned with the common fund paradigm than the statutory 
fee paradigm.  Although class counsel and GM contend (and the 
district court believed) that the fee was a separate agreement, 
thus superficially resembling the separate awards in statutory 
fee cases, private agreements to structure artifically separate 
fee and settlement arrangements cannot transform what is in 
economic reality a common fund situation into a statutory fee 
shifting case.  Certainly, the court may select the lodestar 
method in some non-statutory fee cases where it can calculate the 
relevant parameters (hours expended and hourly rate) more easily 
than it can determine a suitable percentage to award.  But the 
court must vigilantly guard against the lodestar's potential to 
exacerbate the misalignment of the attorneys' and the class's 
interests.  See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. at 717.   
 In this case, the fee clearly was not made pursuant to 
a statute; therefore no legislatively endorsed policy favors 
assuring counsel an adequate fee.  And the settlement, though 
difficult to value, did not award the even more hard-to-value 
intangible rights that could in some limited circumstances 
justify using the lodestar method.  In sum, although this case 
  
presents a hybrid, we believe that it more closely resembles a 
common fund case.   
 At all events, to the extent that the district court 
relied on the lodestar method, it erred by applying a multiplier.  
In the lodestar section of its analysis, the district court 
calculated the multiplier needed to apply to the simple lodestar 
result, $3,158,182, to obtain the requested amount, $9,500,000. 
(see Feb. order at 4-5.)  After estimating the multiplier to be 
between 2.5 and 3, the court proceeded with a "contingent nature 
of the success" analysis of the multiplier's appropriateness from 
Lindy. See Lindy Bros. Builders Inc., v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1976).  
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the use of multipliers 
to enhance the lodestar's hourly rate amount.  See City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2638.  Notwithstanding this 
clear Supreme Court precedent, GM's counsel failed to apprise the 
district court about Dague even though its pertinence was patent.   
 To the extent that the district court construed the fee 
agreement as a common fund, its analysis also appears to 
misapprehend key aspects of the percentage of recovery method.  
In common fund cases, a district judge can award attorneys' fees 
as a percentage of the fund recovered.  See Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 900 n.16, 104 S. Ct. 1541 n.16 (1984); In re Smithkline 
Beckman Corp. Secur. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  
One court has noted that the fee awards have ranged from nineteen 
  
percent to forty-five percent of the settlement fund.  Id. at 
533.  Here, the district court summarily asserted that, although 
it could not value the settlement precisely, "whatever method is 
used in computing the ultimate value of the settlement, the 
attorneys' fees sought in this action will constitute an 
extremely small percentage of the total value and will be minute 
compared to the aforesaid 19-45% range."  (Feb. order at 10.)   
 Given our skepticism of the settlements' value 
generally and of Simonsen's estimates in particular (see supra 
discussion on settlement fairness), we are much less sanguine 
that the $9,500,000 fee actually constitutes an acceptable 
percentage of the class recovery.  On the current record, we are 
constrained to reject that conclusion.  At the very least, the 
district court on remand needs to make some reasonable assessment 
of the settlement's value and determine the precise percentage 
represented by the attorneys' fees.  The problem, however, is not 
simple, for arguably, any settlement based on the award of 
certificates would provide too speculative a value on which to 
base a fee award.  (See Task Force, 108 F.R.D. at 250-53 
(discussing the preferability of the lodestar method for civil 
rights actions where the difficulty of valuing injunctive relief 
complicates the calculation of a fee using the percentage 
method.)  
 On remand, the district court might wish to examine the 
fee primarily under the percentage of recovery scheme.  If so, 
  
the court will need to determine a precise valuation of the 
settlement on which to base its award.  The court may however, as 
a check, want to use the lodestar method to assure that the 
precise percentage awarded is not unreasonable. 
 
VIII.  OTHER ISSUES; CONCLUSION 
 Objectors also appealed the district court's denial of 
discovery into the settlement negotiations and the adequacy of 
the notice with respect to the attorneys' fees.  In light of our 
holding on the certification and settlement approval issues and 
its effect on the need for us to judge the fee award, we need not 
reach these issues. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the orders 
certifying the provisional class and approving the settlement and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Parties to bear their own costs. 
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JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the central 
holding and with the judgment. 
  
 The court today issues a truly masterful opinion.  I 
concur fully in the central holding of the court that the 
district court failed to make adequate findings under Rule 23(a) 
to justify class certification, and that the case must be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings, and 
amplification of the record.  I concur fully in the reasoning of 
the court that supports this conclusion and holding, and concur 
specifically in Parts I, II, III, IV.A, D, E, F, and V.A and B.1 
of the opinion. 
 In addition, I certainly agree that it follows that the 
district court on remand must consider further the issues of the 
adequacy of representation, whether the settlement is fair, 
reasonable and adequate, and if reached, issues relating to 
attorneys' fees. 
 With respect to the remainder of the opinion, I am of 
the thought that some of the discussion is simply not required to 
support the holding we reach, specifically Part IV.B and C.  In 
view of the fact that we are remanding for adequate findings 
under Rule 23(a), I think we need not reach the issue of whether 
the class requisites have been made on the current record, as we 
can anticipate that the district court will conduct further 
proceedings and make additional record in order to fully support 
such findings.  Thus, I think Part V.B.2 dealing with adequacy of 
representation, Part VI dealing with whether the settlement is 
fair, reasonable and adequate on the record before us, and Part 
  
VII dealing with issues relating to the attorneys' fees simply 
need not be addressed in detail as they may come before this 
court on a far different record after remand. 
 I must make clear that I have misgivings about not 
joining in the full opinion.  The opinion is a most thorough and 
scholarly analysis of the numerous issues surrounding settlement 
of class actions and approval of settlement classes.  It will 
stand as the opinion of the court.  My concerns are simply that 
the court has discussed areas that it need not reach. 
